To Transfer or Not to Transfer: Identifying and Protecting Relevant Human Rights Interests in Non-Refoulement by Padmanabhan, Vijay
Vanderbilt University Law School
Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
2011
To Transfer or Not to Transfer: Identifying and
Protecting Relevant Human Rights Interests in
Non-Refoulement
Vijay Padmanabhan
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact
mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Vijay Padmanabhan, To Transfer or Not to Transfer: Identifying and Protecting Relevant Human Rights Interests in Non-Refoulement, 80
Fordham Law Review. 73 (2011)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications/607
? ???? ?????
Citation: 80 Fordham L. Rev. 73 2011-2012 
Content downloaded/printed from 
HeinOnline (http://heinonline.org)
Mon Jun 25 13:22:15 2012
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
   of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
   agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from 
   uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
   of your HeinOnline license, please use:
   https://www.copyright.com/ccc/basicSearch.do?  
   &operation=go&searchType=0   
   &lastSearch=simple&all=on&titleOrStdNo=0015-704X
Retrieved from DiscoverArchive, 
Vanderbilt University’s Institutional Repository 
This work was originally published in 
80 Fordham L. Rev. 73 2011-2012
TO TRANSFER OR NOT TO TRANSFER:
IDENTIFYING AND PROTECTING RELEVANT
HUMAN RIGHTS INTERESTS
IN NON-REFOULEMENT
Vijay M Padmanabhan*
Human rights law imposes upon States an absolute duty not to transfer
an individual to another State where there are substantial grounds for
believing he or she will be tortured or subjected to cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment. This protection, called non-refoulement, emanates
from a theory of human rights that recognizes rights fulfillment requires
States to protect those within their jurisdiction from rights violations
perpetrated by third parties, including other States. Generally human
rights law recognizes that resource constraints and/or competing rights
restrict protection duties. But such limitations have not been recognized in
the non-refoulement context.
In recent years the obligation to provide non-refoulement protection has
run into conflict with the State's obligation to protect its public from aliens
suspected of involvement in terrorism. Expulsion is the traditional tool
available to States to mitigate the threat posed by dangerous aliens. With
this tool removed, States often lack an alternative route to mitigate this
threat, with criminal prosecution and indefinite detention pending
deportation not available for various reasons. The result has been
numerous cases where States have been forced either to release dangerous
aliens back onto the street, consistent with international law, or to find
alternative means to deal with the threat in the shadow of human rights
law.
This Article argues that there is a clash of human rights duties that arises
in these transfer situations: the State's duty to protect aliens from post-
transfer mistreatment conflicts with its duty to protect members of the
public from rights violations committed by dangerous private persons
within society. Human rights law has in recent years recognized a duty on
* Assistant Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. Attorney-Adviser at the
U.S. Department of State, 2003-08. The opinions and characterizations in this Article are
those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official positions of the United
States. Special thanks to Jonathan Eskow and James Fantau for their work as research
assistants on this piece. Also thanks to Geoffrey Corn, Ashley S. Deeks, Ryan Goodman,
Monica Hakimi, Michel Rosenfeld, Matthew Waxman, Ingrid Wuerth, and the Junior
Faculty Working Group at Cardozo Law School without whose thoughtful engagement this
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the part of States to take reasonable operational measures to protect the
public from private person harms where the State knows or should know of
the risk. In the case of dangerous aliens, these operational measures
presumably would include expulsion. By depriving the State of the ability
to expel dangerous aliens, non-refoulement protection places the human
rights of dangerous aliens and the public into direct conflict.
Recognition of this rights competition is important for two reasons.
First, for too long human rights scholars and bodies have dismissed the
security consequences of non-refoulement as outside the concern of human
rights. Acceptance that these security consequences themselves affect
human rights requires consideration of how the law should address the
conflict. Second, once a rights competition is accepted, human rights law
prescribes a methodology for mediating between conflicting rights:
balancing. A balancing approach would allow States a margin of
appreciation to determine in the first instance how to choose between
competing duties. The role of human rights apparatus, including national
courts, international institutions, and non-governmental organizations, is to
monitor this balance and to push States where the balance chosen appears
over or under rights protective.
A balancing approach has at least three major advantages. First, it
brings within the law both relevant sets of human rights, ensuring that the
rights competition in which States are engaged is recognized by the law.
This recognition allows for better monitoring by the human rights
apparatus, and reduces the incentives of States to act outside of the law in
protecting the public. Second, balancing reduces the security consequences
for States of granting additional categories of post-transfer mistreatment
non-refoulement protection-a major goal of the human rights movement-
thereby increasing the likelihood States will accept such future obligations.
Third, by balancing the need to protect rights between both the transferring
and receiving States, a balancing approach may actually lead to a more
comprehensive anti-torture strategy, and therefore reduced occurrence of
the practice.
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INTRODUCTION
In April 2009, British police detained ten Pakistani men who were in the
United Kingdom on student visas for alleged involvement in a plot to bomb
a British shopping center in a "mass casualty" operation on behalf of al
Qaida.1  British police had the ten men under surveillance based on
intercepted e-mails and other intelligence information suggesting an
imminent attack on a Manchester mall, but were forced to move to detain
the suspects immediately after the details of the plot and the police plans to
thwart it were discovered by the press. 2 The resulting premature raids
turned up no explosives or bomb-making equipment, leading Her Majesty's
Government (HMG) to conclude terrorism charges could not be brought
against the suspects.3
Instead, HMG moved to deport the men to Pakistan, including Abid
Naseer, alleged plot ringleader, whose presence in the United Kingdom was
deemed "a threat to national security." 4 Naseer contested the finding that
he posed a threat to the national security of the United Kingdom. 5 He also
opposed removal on grounds that he faced a real risk of torture or inhuman
and degrading treatment in Pakistan. 6 Transfer under such circumstances
would violate Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR). 7 The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has interpreted
this provision to include an implicit obligation not to transfer individuals to
a State where they face real risk of torture or inhuman and degrading
treatment after transfer, which is the principle of non-refoulement.8
The Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) ruled in favor of
Naseer. 9 After evaluating intelligence and other closed materials as well as
1. See John F. Bums, Deportation Case Presents Test of British Government, N.Y.
TIMES, May 19, 2010, at A8.
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See Immigration Rules, pt. 9, 1 322(5) (U.K.), available at
http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/policyandlaw/immigrationlaw/immigrationrules/ (last
visited Sept. 21, 2011) (allowing denial of leave to remain in the United Kingdom because of
"the undesirability of permitting the person concerned to remain in the United Kingdom in
the light of his character, conduct or associations or the fact that he represents a threat to
national security"); see also Bums, supra note 1.
5. See Burns, supra note 1.
6. See id.
7. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art.
3, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter ECHR]
("No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.").
8. See infra notes 71-79 and accompanying text (discussing ECtHR case law).
Traditionally, the term "refoulement" refers only to summary refusal to admit an alien who
has no lawful right of entry into the State and summary repatriation of an alien found
illegally in the territory of the State (reconduction). Refoulement can be contrasted to
expulsion or deportation, which requires lawfully-present aliens to be removed after a legal
process. Guy S. GoODWIN-GILL & JANE McADAM, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
201 (3d ed. 2007). For purposes of this Article, non-refoulement refers more broadly to the
prohibition of all kinds of transfer based on risk of post-transfer mistreatment.
9. Naseer v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [May 18, 2010] No.
SC77/80/21/82/83/09 (Special Immigration Appeals Comm'n [S.I.A.C.]), slip op. 37
752011]
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an extensive e-mail correspondence between Naseer and an al Qaida
member in Pakistan, SIAC credited HMG's allegations that Naseer was in
the final stages of planning an attack on a shopping mall in northwest
England.' 0 This led Justice Mitting to conclude that "Naseer was an AlQaeda operative who posed and still poses a serious threat to the national
security of the United Kingdom."" Nevertheless, Mitting held that
deportation to Pakistan was not permissible, consistent with the principle of
non-refoulement.1 2  SIAC noted the history of Pakistani intelligence
officials mistreating alleged Islamic militants, and refused to accept HMG's
argument that the public notoriety of the case would ensure Naseer's
safety.13
The decision left HMG with few options to mitigate the "serious threat to
the national security of the United Kingdom" posed by Naseer. 14
Prosecution in the case was not possible because of the lack of physical
evidence linking Naseer to the bomb plot. Preventive detention pending
deportation in similar circumstances was found to violate the ECHR by the
British Law Lords. '5 And deportation to a country other than Pakistan was
virtually impossible because no State would accept a suspected al Qaida
terrorist for resettlement. HMG was left imposing control orders, or parole-
like restrictions, on Naseer's movement and employment, with the
knowledge that similar restrictions have been easily evaded by others in the
past. 16
The Naseer case is an example of the serious security consequences that
may result from providing non-refoulement protection in a post 9/11 world.
The principle of non-refoulement has been justified by human rights bodies
and advocates as a part of the jus cogens prohibition on torture and cruel,inhuman, or degrading treatment.' 7  While these prohibitions are
(U.K.), available at http://www.siac.tribunals.gov.uk/Documents/outcomes/
lOpenJudgment.pdf.
10. See id $T 7-15; see also Bums, supra note 1.
11. Naseer, slip op. 16.
12. See id. 30-39.
13. See id. T 32-34.
14. See id 16.
15. See A v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2004] UKHL 56, [68] (appeal taken
from Eng.) (rejecting British law pending indefinite detention of aliens suspected of
terrorism pending deportation as a violation of the European Convention).
16. See Bums, supra note 1; see also Colm O'Cinneide, Strapped to the Mast: The
Siren Song of Dreadful Necessity, the United Kingdom, Human Rights Act and Terrorist
Threat, in FRESH PERSPECTIVES ON THE 'WAR ON TERROR' 327, 343 (Miriam Gani &
Penelope Mathew eds., 2008) (describing failures of the control order system).
17. For shorthand purposes, this Article will refer to the "jus cogens torture norm" to
encompass both torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. See RESTATEMENT(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 702 cmt. n (1987) (describing asjus cogens prohibition on
"torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment"). As discussed
below, the criteria for concluding a norm isjus cogens is unclear, see infra notes 247-48 and
accompanying text, and scholars and courts have contested whether cruel, inhuman, anddegrading treatment rises to the level ofjus cogens, see Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp.
1531, 1543 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (refusing to recognize cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment
as a cognizable violation of the Alien Tort Statute because of the lack of consensus on
meaning of the terms); ABA, Report to the House of Delegates (Aug. 9, 2004) in THE
76 [Vol. 80
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traditionally thought to forbid a State from employing torture or cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment, human rights bodies have explained that if
a State cannot subject an individual to these forms of mistreatment, neither
may they send the individual to a State where that mistreatment may
occur.18 Because there are no exceptions to the torture or cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment prohibitions in human rights law, these bodies have
concluded that there are no exceptions to non-refoulement either.19 In
recent years, human rights bodies also have sought to expand the scope of
non-refoulement protection to other human rights abuses, seeking to
prohibit transfer where there is a real risk to the transferee of enforced
disappearance, unfair post-transfer trial, or recruitment as a child soldier. 20
Ever-expanding non-refoulement duties deprive States of a traditional
tool used to protect its population from security threats posed by aliens:
expulsion. Unlike nationals of a State, who are legally entitled to be present
in the State, aliens are present at the prerogative of the host State. States
have traditionally used this plenary authority over the presence of aliens to
exclude or expel dangerous aliens. 21 Depriving States of this tool may
leave them, as in the Naseer case, with no real option to mitigate real
threats. 22 This concern, magnified by the threat of terrorism, has led a
variety of States to advocate a change in the non-refoulement rule to permit
States to consider the security risk the alien poses to the State as a factor in
determining whether transfer is possible. 23 Such a change would hark back
to the origins of non-refoulement protections, which included security
exceptions. 24 The security consequences of accepting non-refoulement
duties also have led States to resist expansion of non-refoulement protection
to lesser forms of mistreatment as advocated by human rights institutions. 25
The human rights apparatus has resisted such a change for two reasons.
First, it argues that the prohibition on torture and cruel, inhuman, and
degrading treatment is absolute, and not subject to exception. 26 Opening
TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD To ABU GHRAIB 1132, 1146 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L.
Dratel eds., 2005) ("While many international agreements expressly prohibit both torture and
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, it remains an open question as to whether jus
cogens status extends to the prohibition against cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.");
Richard B. Lillich, Remarks to the American Society of International Law (Apr. 26, 1985),
in The Revised Draft Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States and
Customary International Law, 79 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 73, 86 (1985) (noting that
commentators might not consider the norm prohibiting cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment "customary international law, much less of jus cogens").
18. See infra notes 70-83 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
22. See supra notes 1-16 and accompanying text.
23. Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3 (Can.);
see also Observations of the Governments of Lithuania, Portugal, Slovakia and the United
Kingdom, Ramzy v. Netherlands, App. No. 25424/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005) [hereinafter
Observations], available at http://www.redress.org/Government-intervenorsobservations_
in Ramzycase%20 21November.pdf.
24. See infra notes 55-58, 63-69 and accompanying text.
25. See infra Part I.C.
26. See infra notes 71-86, 89-91 and accompanying text.
772011]
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non-refoulement protection to exceptions, advocates worry, will lead to
similar exceptions to the basic prohibition on States torturing or otherwise
severely mistreating individuals. 27  The result, the apparatus fears, is
policies like enhanced interrogation and rendition used by the Bush
Administration to combat terrorism. 28 Second, it contends that even if
human rights law wanted to account for the threat posed by the alien to the
host State, it could not do so given the incomparable nature of the threat
posed by the alien and the threat the alien himself faces. The result would
be an apples-to-oranges comparison outside the scope of human rights
law. 29
These arguments fail to account for the human rights costs of the current
rule. Allowing dangerous aliens to remain free within society risks their
commission of acts that constitute serious violations of human rights. This
reality has led States to take measures to mitigate the security consequences
of granting non-refoulement protection that have negative second-order
human rights effects. States have refused to capture or admit aliens from
countries where repatriation will be difficult, harming those aliens or those
at threat from their actions in the process. 30 Some States also have misused
diplomatic assurances, or promises from the receiving State not to mistreat
transferred persons, to feign compliance with existing non-refoulement
rules, while in fact subjecting the transferred person to substantial risk of
mistreatment, without assessment of whether the threat in question merits
such a harsh result. 31 The resulting distortions in the law have led officials
of at least one State to consider withdrawing from its non-refoulement
obligations entirely. 32 At minimum, it has led to State opposition to further
expansion of non-refoulement protections.
The full range of human rights equities at issue in non-refoulement has
not been captured because of the failure to identify the relevant State duties
and rights at issue in non-refoulement. It has been thirty years since Henry
Shue identified three duties that exist with all human rights obligations: the
duty to avoid harm, the duty to protect from the harm, and the duty to aid
individuals in fulfillment of their right.33  Properly understood, States
27. See infra note 181 and accompanying text.
28. See infra note 182 and accompanying text.
29. See infra note 267 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
31. See infra note 185 and accompanying text.
32. The Conservative Party's winning manifesto in the 2010 elections called for the
repeal of the Human Rights Act, which implements the ECHR into British law, in part
because of concerns regarding non-refoulement protection. See Andrew Sparrow & Patrick
Wintour, Coalition Reconsidering Tory Plan to Scrap Human Rights Act, GUARDIAN (May
19, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/may/I9/theresa-may-coalition-human-
rights-act-scrap (quoting Conservative Party manifesto); see also David Stringer, UK:
European Law Hampering Terrorism Fight, ABC NEWS, Feb. 3, 2011,http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=12830352 (describing report by Lord
Carlile, House of Lords terrorism monitor, arguing ECHR is turning the U.K. into a refuge
for international terrorism). Coalition partners, the Liberal Democrats, forced the Tories to
abandon this campaign pledge as part of the coalition agreement.
33. See HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY 60 (1980). Shue explained the three distinct State duties as follows: (1) the duty to
78 [Vol. 80
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making transfer determinations with respect to dangerous aliens face a
conflict between two competing duties to protect.
One such duty is well developed. States have a duty to protect aliens
from the risk of serious human rights abuses perpetrated by another State
after transfer. Such a duty has already been recognized with torture and
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment by most States and human rights
actors, and may in the future be accepted for other, less serious human
rights violations.34 Less developed is the growing recognition by human
rights bodies that a State has a duty to protect those within its jurisdiction
from human rights violations committed by non-State actors, including
dangerous aliens present within the State's territory. 35 Such an obligation
has been recognized by the ECtHR, the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, the Human Rights Committee (HRC), and various national courts as
emanating from the right to life and the right to be free of torture and cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment. 36  It is these two duties, and the
corresponding human rights, that conflict in transfer determinations
regarding dangerous aliens.
Recognizing this rights competition is important for three reasons. First,
a change in rhetoric has the potential to alter the non-refoulement debate.
Human rights bodies and scholars for too long have elided over the security
consequences of the current non-refoulement rule because they believed
these costs were outside the province of human rights law. 37 In fact, human
rights are threatened when dangerous aliens are permitted to remain free to
commit rights violations. Determining how the State should mediate
between these two conflicting protection duties is very much a task for
human rights law.
Second, understanding non-refoulement as a protection duty provides an
intellectual architecture to separate it from the jus cogens prohibition on
committing acts of torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.
Protection duties in human rights law are traditionally limited by competing
resources and conflicting rights, restrictions which are anomalously missing
here. 38 Recognizing such constraints on non-refoulement would bring the
State's non-refoulement obligation into accord with the duty to protect from
torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment perpetrated by private
persons. And it would align the law with the traditional legal view that
avoid: negative duty not to violate the right in question; (2) the duty to protect: positive
duty to prevent third parties from violating the right; and (3) the duty to aid: positive duty to
take steps to allow individuals to realize their right. Id. at 53.
34. See infra notes 70-86, 89-91, 94-97 and accompanying text.
35. The United States has been a conspicuous laggard in accepting these developments.
See infra notes 209-14 (describing U.S. opposition to most positive human rights).
36. See infra notes 219-20, 227-39 and accompanying text.
37. See Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, There's No Place like Home: States' Obligations in
Relation to Transfers of Persons, 90 INT'L REV. RED CROss 703, 707 (2008) (addressing in a
cursory fashion the security consequences created by granting non-refoulement protection).
38. See infra notes 242-43 and accompanying text.
792011]
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greater duties are owed with respect to intentional actions as opposed to
unintentional actions taken with disregard of substantial risk of harm. 39
Third, human rights law uses a balancing approach to mediate between
competing rights. Balancing is used in human rights law to weigh such
diverse interests as the right to free speech versus freedom of religion; the
right to assemble versus the State's interest in protecting public order; and
the State's obligation to provide health care versus other competing
obligations for State resources. 40 A balancing approach allows States a
margin of appreciation to strike a balance between competing rights
consistent with national priorities, recognizing differences in how States
may value different rights. Human rights monitoring bodies, including
national courts, then police this balance, using different tools to pressure
States whose balance does not accord with the views of those institutions
regarding the importance of both rights.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I develops the narrative of non-
refoulement today. States have traditionally had plenary authority to
protect State interests through expulsion of aliens. But human rights law
has slowly chipped away at that right through recognition of ever greater
State obligations to retain aliens when facing risk of post-transfer
mistreatment. This legal evolution, always under-theorized, has been
subjected to ever greater resistance by some States because of the serious
danger that implementation of the rule creates with alien terrorist suspects.
The failure of the law to adjust has led States to use different methods to
evade the non-refoulement rule, and to oppose further expansion of its
protections.
Part II explains that the non-refoulement debate is properly conceived as
a conflict between two competing State duties to protect human rights.
States are required to protect those within their jurisdictions from the threat
of human rights violations committed by other States. States also are
required to protect those within the State's jurisdiction from rights
violations committed by non-State actors, including dangerous aliens.
These duties are in tension in non-refoulement. Understanding both
relevant duties as protection duties highlights the extent to which non-
refoulement is an outlier in human rights law, which otherwise recognizes
limitations on protection duties. This Part argues that non-refoulement
should be treated like other protection duties, and be subject to limitations
and exceptions. It also refutes the argument that the power of the torture
norm compels the existing rule.
Part III explains that human rights law generally uses balancing to
mediate between conflicting rights. Human rights law balancing gives
States discretion to strike a balance between competing duties consistent
with cultural values and national priorities, thereby giving States some
flexibility to remain within a human rights law framework while protecting
its population. But this discretion is not unbridled, as human rights
39. See infra notes 257-58 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 268-73 and accompanying text.
80 [Vol. 80
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institutions, including national courts, monitor States to push them to strike
balances that are consistent with the values underlying human rights law.
The effectiveness of this monitoring is improved when human rights groups
can engage with the rights trade-off driving State action, not permissible
under the current rule. This part concludes by considering the problems of
bias and uncertainty created by the use of a balancing approach.
Ultimately, international law, as a system largely dependent upon
voluntary State compliance, functions best where the law captures the
interests of States. Rules which produce outcomes recognized by States as
"incoherent, unfair, or absurd" are unlikely to pull States toward voluntary
compliance.41 By moving to a new non-refoulement rule that recognizes
the duty of the State to protect its own people, enhanced rights protection
and more stable rule compliance are likely outcomes.
I. NON-REFOULEMENT RULE: HISTORY, TENSION, ADJUSTMENT
A. Development of the Modern Non-refoulement Rule
International law recognizes the absolute sovereignty of a State over its
territory, which includes the right to decide whether to admit or expel
aliens, except where otherwise restricted by treaty commitments or
customary international law. 42 This authority gives States the ability to use
admission and expulsion to combat threats to national security posed by
dangerous aliens. Through World War II, concerns about the risk of post-
transfer mistreatment generally did not restrict State discretion with respect
to aliens. 43 Prior to the war, a small number of European States did enter
into agreements restricting expulsion of Russian or German refugees who
faced risk of mistreatment upon repatriation, if they had been granted the
right to reside in a contracting State. But these treaties had few adherents,
and allowed States to remove refugees where required by national security
or public order.44 As a result, States that fought World War II retained
plenary control over admission and deportation of aliens.
41. THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 84 (1990). Using
Franck's terminology, the current non-refoulement rule may be thought of as an "idiot rule,"
meaning a simple rule that creates unreasonable and illegitimate demands at the margins. Id
at 77. Franck explains that such results tend to undermine the rule's overall legitimacy, a
phenomenon that this Article supports. See id. (describing effects of "idiot rules").
42. 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 940 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th
ed. 1996); see also U.N. Human Rights Comm., CCPR General Comment 15: The Position
of Aliens Under the Covenant, T 5, U.N. Doc. No. A/41/40 (Apr. 11, 1986) ("The Covenant
does not recognize the right of aliens to enter or reside in the territory of a State party. It is
in principle a matter for the State to decide who it will admit to its territory.").
43. See GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 8, at 201-03 (summarizing
developments in international law before and during World War II).
44. See Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees art. 3, Oct. 28, 1933,
159 L.N.T.S. 199 ("Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes not to remove or keep from
its territory by application of police measures, such as expulsions or non-admittance at the
frontier (refoulement), refugees who have been authorized to reside there regularly, unless
the said measures are dictated by reasons of national security or public order."); see also
Convention Concerning the Status of Refugees Coming from Germany art. 5, Feb. 10, 1938,
2011] 81
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States used this authority during and after the War in a manner that
resulted in many innocent deaths. In some instances States refused
admission to individuals fleeing severe mistreatment at home, forcing them
to return to their home countries and near-certain death. Switzerland, for
example, refused entry to nearly 20,000 French Jews who sought asylum
there after the Nazi takeover of France. 45 The Swiss argued the "boat is
full" with respect to refugees during the War, and they were not obligated
under existing law to accept French Jews for resettlement. 46 As a result the
Jews were forced to return to France, where most were killed.47 In 1939, a
ship with hundreds of Germans seeking refuge was turned away summarily
by the United States because of a policy not to admit anyone into the
country that lacked a valid visa for admission. 48 The ship returned to
Europe, and predictably many of the passengers ended up dead. 49
In other instances, States transferred aliens who were already present
within their territory to their home government, again resulting in severe
mistreatment or death. Wartime and post-war transfers to the Soviet Union
resulted in the death or severe mistreatment of over two million people.50
The United States and the United Kingdom committed to repatriating all
Soviet prisoners after the war, with no provision made for prisoners who
expressed fears of mistreatment after transfer.5' True to the agreement, the
Western Allies transferred to the Soviets prisoners who expressed fears of
mistreatment. 52 Tragically, these fears of mistreatment came true, with
Stalin subjecting many repatriated prisoners to Siberian labor camps, or
even execution. 53 The British also made forcible returns to the Soviets of
civiliang who fell outside the Yalta agreement, including women and
children.54
These wartime practices highlighted the need for treaty-based regimes
restricting the transfer of persons who face the risk of post-transfer
192 L.N.T.S. 59 (same for German refugees); Provisional Arrangement Concerning the
Status of Refugees Coming from Germany, art. 4, July 4, 1936, 171 L.N.T.S. 75 (same).
45. See Detlev F. Vagts, Switzerland, International Law and World War II, 91 AM. J.
INT'L L. 466, 472 (1997) (describing lawful Swiss refugee practice that resulted in deaths of
20,000 French Jews).
46. Id.
47. See id.
48. See BARBARA MCDONALD STEWART, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT POLICY ON
REFUGEES FROM NAZISM: 1933-1940, at 440-43 (1982) (detailing incident involving the S.S.
St. Louis).
49. See id.
50. NIKOLAI TOLSTOY, VICTIMS OF YALTA 19 (1977).
51. See, e.g., Agreement Relating to Prisoners of War and Civilians Liberated by Forces
Operating Under Soviet Command and Forces Operating Under United States of America
Command, U.S.-U.S.S.R., art. 1, Feb. 11, 1945, 59 Stat. 1874 ("All Soviet citizens liberated
by the forces operating under United States command . . . will, without delay after their
liberation, be separated from enemy prisoners of war and will be maintained separately from
them in camps or points of concentration until they have been handed over to the Soviet ...
authorities .... ).
52. See CHRISTIANE SHIELDS DELESSERT, RELEASE AND REPATRIATION OF PRISONERS OF
WAR AT THE END OF ACTIVE HOSTILITIES 151 (1977).
53. See id. at 151-56 (describing Soviet atrocities).
54. See TOLSTOY, supra note 50, at 20-21 (detailing British post-war practice).
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mistreatment. This need was augmented by the large number of displaced
and stateless people in Europe after the War. But States resisted
recognition of an absolute duty to grant safe haven to threatened aliens.
States wished to retain the right to use admission and expulsion of aliens for
a range of policy purposes, including protecting the population from the
threat posed by dangerous aliens, and would not agree to non-refoulement
protection that did not prioritize their security concerns. 55 Thus, treaties
negotiated in the immediate aftermath of World War II limited State
obligations to retain aliens to situations where the alien did not pose a risk
to security.
States negotiating the Third Geneva Convention (3rd GC), regulating
treatment of prisoners of war (POW), or captured combatants in
international armed conflict, rejected formal restrictions on transfer based
on fears of mistreatment. 56 A proposal to allow POW "to apply for their
transfer to any other country which is ready to accept them," was rejected
by States in large part out of concern about the imposition of a duty to
accept POW who feared repatriation.57 Instead, the 3rd GC includes an
absolute obligation to release and repatriate POWs at the end of
hostilities.58
Nevertheless, State practice since 1949 reflects a general unwillingness,
at least in the West, to return prisoners to face mistreatment. After the
Korean War, U.N. forces, led by the United States, resisted Soviet, Chinese,
and North Korean demands that prisoners who feared post-transfer
treatment be forcibly repatriated to the North, resettling some prisoners in
South Korea and the United States instead. 59 Similar practices followed the
Iran-Iraq War, the First Gulf War, and the wars in the former Yugoslavia. 60
This practice has led Theodor Meron to argue prisoners now have the "right
of free choice" with respect to post-conflict repatriation, albeit one
conditioned on the consent of States to accept POWs for resettlement.61
The Fourth Geneva Convention (4th GC) leans farther forward,
restricting States from transferring protected persons, who are civilians in
occupied territory or in the territory of a Party to an armed conflict, to face
persecution. Article 45 of the 4th GC prohibits the transfer of protected
55. See Kathleen M. Keller, Note, A Comparative and International Law Perspective on
the United States (Non) Compliance with its Duty of Non-Refoulement, 2 YALE H.R. & DEV.
L.J. 183, 186 (1999) (contending purpose of exceptions was to strengthen norm of non-
refoulement by making compliance more "realistic").
56. See INT'L CoMM. RED CROSS, COMMENTARY III: GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO
THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 542 (Jean S. Pictet ed., A.P. de Heney trans., 1960).
57. Id.
58. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 118,
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 ("Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without
delay after the cessation of active hostilities.").
59. See Jan P. Charmatz & Harold M. Wit, Repatriation of Prisoners of War and the
1949 Geneva Convention, 62 YALE L.J. 391, 391-94 (1953) (describing the struggle between
the United States and Soviet Union over this issue).
60. See Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT'L L.
239, 256 (2000) (summarizing practice).
6 1. Id.
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persons in the territory of a Party to the conflict "to a country where he or
she may have reason to fear persecution for his or her political opinions or
religious beliefs." 62 But Article 45 allows transfer of "aliens in individual
cases when State security demands such action." 63 The 4th GC also
expressly refuses to allow fears of persecution to restrict extraditions for
ordinary crimes conducted pursuant to treaties in place prior to the
conflict.64
The 1950 Convention Related to the Status of Refugees (Refugee
Convention) provides still more extensive non-refoulement protection for
refugees, or non-nationals fleeing persecution in their home States. Article
33(1) prohibits States from expelling or returning a refugee "where his life
or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion." 65 The initial
draft of the Convention included no restrictions on this obligation. 66 The
British objected to the lack of a security exception in the draft provision,
and together with the French proposed language retaining for the State the
right to use admission and expulsion to protect security interests. 67 Article
33(2) denies non-refoulement protections to refugees if there are reasonable
grounds for regarding the detainee as "a danger to the security of the
country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment
of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of
that country." 68 Like the other post-War non-refoulement provisions, this
one is generally interpreted as granting States an absolute right to expel
refugees who fall within Article 33(2).69
62. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
art. 45, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter 4th GC].
63. INT'L COMM. RED CROSS, COMMENTARY IV: GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO
THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 266 (Jean S. Pictet ed., Ronad Griffin
& C.W. Dumbleton trans., 1958) (explaining that Article 45 does not restrict expulsions of
"undesirable foreigner[s]" from State territory).
64. 4th GC, supra note 62, art. 45 ("The provisions of this Article do not constitute an
obstacle to the extradition, in pursuance of extradition treaties concluded before the outbreak
of hostilities, of protected persons accused of offences against ordinary criminal law.").
65. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 33(1), July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention].
66. PAUL WEIS, THE REFUGEE CONVENTION, 1951: THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES
ANALYSED, WITH A COMMENTARY 325 (Julian Weis ed., 1995).
67. Id. at 328.
68. Refugee Convention, supra note 65, art. 33(2). Article 1(F) of the Refugee
Convention exempts from refugee protection individuals who have committed war crimes,
crimes against the peace, serious non-political crimes, or acts contrary to the purposes and
principles of the United Nations outside the country of refuge. Id. art. 1(F). The purpose of
this provision was to ensure that individuals who do not deserve protection based on their
past conduct do not abuse the refugee system. See WEIS, supra note 66, at xiii. Individuals
falling into these categories may additionally pose a threat to the security of the State where
they are present, making security a secondary benefit of these restrictions.
69. See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425-28 (1999) (explicitly rejecting
balancing test proposed by UNHCR); Dhayakpa v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs
(1995) 62 FCR 556, 563 (Austl.) ("There is no obligation under the Convention .. . to weigh
up the degree of seriousness of a serious crime against the possible harm to the
applicant.. . ."); Malouf v. Canada, [1995] 190 N.R. 230, 230 (Can. F.C.A.) (holding
Article 1(F) does not require balancing "the seriousness of the Applicant's conduct against
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While these post-war instruments viewed non-refoulement protection as
a stand-alone right limited by security considerations, the European
Commission on Human Rights (Commission), a human rights expert body
with responsibility for determining which cases would be heard by the
ECtHR, concluded in the 1960s that this protection was a manifestation of
the broader prohibition on torture and inhuman and degrading treatment
found in Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 70 The
Commission provided little justification for its interpretation of the ECHR.
But this shift in conception was important because the prohibition on torture
and inhuman and degrading treatment is absolute under human rights law.
By categorizing non-refoulement as a manifestation of these absolute rights,
the legal status of the security exceptions to this duty was drawn into
question.
The ECtHR formally adopted the Commission's interpretation of ECHR
Article 3 in its decisions in Soering v. United Kingdom7' and Chahal v.
United Kingdom.72 Article 3 prohibits State Parties from engaging in
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment under any circumstances, but
contains no express restrictions on transfer. 73 In Soering the court held that
Article 3 includes an implied obligation for State Parties not to extradite an
individual to a State where there are substantial grounds for believing the
person will be subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment after
transfer.74 While the court acknowledged that there was no such express
requirement in the treaty, it noted that the object and purpose of the treaty is
to protect human rights and to "promote the ideals and values of a
democratic society." 75 The court asserted without reasoning that it would
be incompatible with these purposes to allow extradition where the
the alleged fear of persecution"); S. v Refugee Status Appeals Authority [1998] 2 NZLR 301
(HG) 314-19 (agreeing with Malouf), aff'd, [1998] 2 NZLR 291 (CA); T v. Sec'y of State
for the Home Dep't, [1996] A.C. 742 (H.L.) 769 (appeal taken from Eng.) (Mustill, L.J.)
(holding application of Article 1(F) "cannot depend on the consequences which the offender
may afterwards suffer if he is returned"). But see U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees (HCR),
Guidelines on International Protection: Application of the Exclusion Clauses: Article IF of
the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, T 24, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/03/05
(Sept. 4, 2003) (arguing that gravity of the "non-political crime" that merits exclusion must
be weighed against the "consequences of the exclusion"); Letter from Thomas Albrecht,
Deputy Regional Representative, U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, to Paul Engelmayer,
WilmerHale (Jan. 6, 2006), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/43de2da94.pdf
(explaining that Article 33(2) allows refoulement only where the gravity of danger posed by
the individual outweighs the degree of persecution feared after return).
70. See X v. Fed. Republic of Ger., App. No. 1802/62, 1963 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R.
462, 478, 480 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.) (holding that extradition can amount to conduct that
violates Article 3 where person is subject to post-transfer torture or other treatment contrary
to Article 3); see also Kirkwood v. United Kingdom, App. No. 10479/83, 37 Eur. Comm'n
H.R. Dec. & Rep. 158, 171-75 (1984) (same); Altun v. Fed. Republic of Ger., App. No.
10308/83, 36 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 209, 231-34 (1983) (same).
71. 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 32-36 (1989).
72. 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1831, 1853.
73. ECHR, supra note 7, art. 3 ("No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.").
74. Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 35-36.
75. Id. at 34.
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individual faced the real risk of post-transfer torture or inhuman or
degrading treatment. 76
In Chahal the court extended Soering by holding that the threat posed by
the alien to the State where he is located is irrelevant to non-refoulement
analysis. 77 In rejecting a request by the British for recognition of a national
security exception to non-refoulement, the ECtHR relied on the fact that
Article 3 included no national security exception.78 If Article 3 did not
permit a State Party to torture for national security reasons, neither, the
court reasoned, could non-refoulement be subject to security
considerations. 79 The court did not discuss whether identical interests were
protected by the duties to avoid torturing and to protect from acts of torture
committed by others.80 And no discussion was had of the risks to the
human rights of the British people if Chahal were released within the
United Kingdom.81
The HRC has used similar reasoning to conclude that Article 7 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) provides an
absolute protection against transfer to face torture or cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment. 82 In General Comment 31, the Committee went
further and implied from ICCPR Article 2 a broader obligation not to
transfer a person "where there are substantial grounds for believing that
there is a real risk of irreparable harm, such as that contemplated by articles
6 and 7 of the Covenant," without further defining the potential range of
post-transfer risk that could limit transfer. 83 The HRC, like the ECtHR,
paid no attention to potential differences between negative and positive
State duties. The HRC also did not address the impact of the rule on the
State's security interests.
76. See id at 34-35 ("Extradition in such circumstances, while not explicitly referred to
in the brief and general wording of Article 3, would plainly be contrary to the spirit and
intendment of the Article . . . .").
77. See Chahal, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at 1855-56.
78. Id. at 1855.
79. See id. ("The prohibition provided by Article 3 against ill-treatment is equally
absolute in expulsion cases.").
80. See id. at 1853-56.
8 1. See id.
82. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 20: Article 7 (Prohibition
of Torture, or other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment), 9, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21 (Oct. 3, 1992) [hereinafter General Comment No. 20] ("States parties must not
expose individuals to the danger of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment upon return to another country by way of their extradition, expulsion or
refoulement.").
83. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31 [80]: The Nature of the
General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, 12, U.N. Doc
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13 (May 26, 2004) [hereinafter General Comment No. 31]. Article
6 of the ICCPR guarantees the right to life and includes restrictions on the death penalty. See
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. Article 7 prohibits torture or cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment. Id. art. 7.
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Unlike the ECHR and the ICCPR, the Convention Against Torture
(CAT) includes an express non-refoulement provision. 84 Sweden included
what is now Article 3 in its initial draft of the treaty based on the 1960s and
70s jurisprudence of the European Commission on Human Rights discussed
above.85 This provision prohibits transfer of a person to another State
"where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in
danger of being subjected to torture," and includes no express exceptions
for state security concerns. 86 Textually it is not certain that Article 3 allows
for no security exceptions. Article 2, which contains the negative duty not
to torture, includes an express prohibition on justifications for torture, a
prohibition not replicated in Article 3.87 This absence led the United
Kingdom and Portugal, among other States, to argue that "it [was] by no
means clear" that Article 3 was intended to be absolute.88
Nevertheless, the Committee Against Torture and other human rights
actors interpret Article 3 as an absolute manifestation of the right to be free
from torture based on the provision's historical link to the ECHR. The
Committee Against Torture has repeatedly stated its view that Article 3
does not allow for any exceptions. 89  Similarly, the U.N. Special
Rapporteur on the Question of Torture has characterized Article 3 as
absolute,90 viewing the absence of permissible exceptions as derivative of
the absolute nature of the negative duty not to torture.91 None of these
opinions addressed the feasibility of such an interpretation of the rule, nor
its impact on State security.92
84. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment art. 3(1), Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT].
85. MANFRED NOWAK, UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE: A
COMMENTARY 199-200 (2008).
86. CAT, supra note 84, art. 3(1).
87. Id. art. 2(2) ("No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a
threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as
a justification of torture.").
88. See Observations, supra note 23, 26.5.
89. See, e.g., U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Conclusions and Recommendations of the
Committee Against Torture: Canada, T 4(a), U.N. Doc. CAT/C/CR/34/CAN (July 7, 2005)
(describing non-refoulement protection of Article 3 as "absolute" and "not subject to any
exception whatsoever"); see also NOWAK, supra note 85, at 147-48 (summarizing Committee
Against Torture practice on this question).
90. See Special Rapporteur on the Question of Torture, Report of the Special Rapporteur
on the Question of Torture Submitted in Accordance with Comm'n Resolution 2002/38,
Comm'n on Human Rights, 26(o), U.N. Doc. No. E/CN.4/2003/68 (Dec. 17, 2002) (by
Theo van Boven) ("The principle of non-refoulement must be upheld in all circumstances
irrespective of whether the individual concerned has committed crimes and the seriousness
and nature of those crimes.").
91. Special Rapporteur of the Comm'n on Human Rights, Report of the Special
Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
Transmitted by Note of the Secretary-General, 28, U.N. Doc. A/59/234 (Sept. 1, 2004)
("The principle of non-refoulement is an inherent part of the overall absolute and imperative
nature of the prohibition of torture and other forms of ill-treatment.").
92. CAT non-refoulement protection, unlike the implied obligations in the ICCPR and
ECHR, is limited to torture. The Committee Against Torture has recognized that Article 3
was specifically drafted not to extend non-refoulement protections to cruel, inhuman or
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With these developments in human rights law, the law lurched from
categorically preferring State security interests to a similar preference for
the rights of the transferee. Many scholars have argued that that these
developments in human rights law have rendered the security exception in
the Refugee Convention "superfluous." 93 In the process, States have lost
the ability to use admission and expulsion to protect the public from the
threats posed by dangerous aliens who come from States with poor human
rights records.
Human rights advocates and some States next appear determined to
expand the categories of post-transfer mistreatment subject to non-
refoulement protection. The International Convention for the Protection of
all Persons from Enforced Disappearance includes an obligation not to
transfer someone to a State where there are substantial grounds for
believing he will be subjected to enforced disappearance. 94 The Committee
on the Rights of the Child has interpreted the Convention on the Rights of
the Child to include an open-ended obligation not to transfer children
"where there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of
irreparable harm to the child." 95 The Committee suggested that a wide-
range of potential post-transfer problems should preclude transfer, including
inadequate access to food or health care services and real risk of underage
recruitment for sexual abuse or military service. 96 Other human rights
bodies have suggested non-refoulement protection should accompany risk
of unfair trial.97 In all of these instances, it appears these new protections
would not include exceptions for security considerations, thereby further
restricting the right of the State to determine whether dangerous aliens may
be admitted to or expelled from its territory.
degrading treatment. See NOWAK, supra note 85, at 200 (summarizing Committee Against
Torture views to this end).
93. See William A. Schabas, Non-Refoulement, in Expert Workshop on Human Rights
and International Co-operation in Counter-terrorism, Triesenberg, Liechtenstein, Nov. 15-
17, 2006, Final Report, 20, 23, U.N. Doc. ODIHR.GAL/14/07 (Feb. 21, 2007)
(summarizing support for this position). But see James C. Hathaway & Colin J. Harvey,
Framing Refugee Protection in the New World Disorder, 34 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 257,316-18
(2001) (arguing that refugee status has important benefits not provided by non-refoulement
protection in human rights law).
94. See International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance, G.A. Res. 61/177, art. 16(1), U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/177 (Jan. 12, 2007) ("No
State Party shall expel, return ('refouler'), surrender or extradite a person to another State
where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being
subjected to enforced disappearance.").
95. U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child (CRC), General Comment No. 6: Treatment
of Unaccompanied and Separated Children Outside Their Country of Origin, 1 27, U.N. Doc.
CRC/GC/2005/6 (Sept. 1, 2005).
96. Id. 27-28.
97. See INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, SUBMISSION ON THE 3RD PERIODIC REPORT OF
SWITZERLAND TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMM. 3 & n.7 (2009),
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/ngos/ICJSwitzerland97.pdf (summarizing
international organization support for this view).
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B. Terrorism Raises the Stakes
Throughout this evolution toward greater State non-refoulement duties,
States have raised security considerations as an argument against further
expansion. In treaty negotiations dating back to the Refugee Convention,
States have argued that security concerns were a legitimate excuse to non-
refoulement protection. 98 In the drafting of the ICCPR, States rejected a
proposal limiting expulsion of aliens to situations where the alien had been
convicted of one of a list of criminal offenses. 99 The reason was the desire
of States to maintain their plenary control over admission of aliens into
their territory.100 Similar rationale led the United States to argue against
including non-refoulement protection from cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment in the CAT. 101 And in Soering and Chahal, the United Kingdom
vigorously opposed reading ECHR Article 3 to include absolute non-
refoulement protection. 102
Nevertheless, the unique security concerns created by the modern threat
of terrorism have heightened worries about the impact of non-refoulement
protection on state security. Not surprisingly, States are more concerned
when non-refoulement prevents the repatriation of an alien intent on
inflicting massive civilian casualties. Given the magnitude of potential
harm involved in a terrorist attack, States wish to be able to use the most
powerful tools available to combat the threat.
States value repatriation of aliens as a security tool because of the general
ease with which repatriation may be achieved. Substantively, human rights
law only requires that the expulsion decision not be arbitrary, meaning that
the decision is based on the law.1 03 The ICCPR also requires expulsion to
be undertaken consistent with other provisions of the Covenant.104
Procedurally, human rights law only requires that the alien be allowed to
submit the reasons against expulsion to a competent authority that need not
be a court; 10 5 to appeal to a higher authority that need not be a court; 106 and
to be represented during expulsion proceedings. 107
98. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
99. MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR
COMMENTARY 291 & n.5 (2d rev. ed. 2005).
100. See id.
101. See NOWAK, supra note 85, at 200.
102. See supra notes 71-81 and accompanying text.
103. Customary international law requires that States have some justification for
expulsion. 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 42, at 944. Major human rights
treaties all include the requirement that aliens be expelled only in accordance with law. See
ICCPR, supra note 83, art. 13 (permitting expulsion "only in pursuance of a decision
reached in accordance with the law"); Protocol No. 7 to the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as Amended by Protocol No. 11, art. 1, Nov. 1,
1998, E.T.S. No. 117 [hereinafter ECHR Protocol 7] (same); American Convention on
Human Rights art. 22(6), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force July 18,
1978) [hereinafter American Convention] (same); African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights, art. 12(4), June 27, 1981), 21 I.L.M. 58 [hereinafter African Charter] (same).
104. NOWAK, supra note 99, at 295. This means, for example, that the statute cannot
discriminate impermissibly, such as by targeting a particular ethnic group, and cannot call
for collective expulsions.
105. ICCPR, supra note 83, art. 13; ECHR Protocol 7, supra note 103, art. 1(a).
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These procedural requirements are subject to waiver in compelling cases
of national security.108 In its communication regarding the case of Karker
v. France, the HRC upheld the decision of France to forego providing
Karker with process prior to expulsion in a case where the French
government sought expulsion because it feared he was involved with an
Islamic extremist organization. 109
Expulsion is important because States often are left without any viable
alternative to mitigate the threat when it is not available. Contrary to the
suggestions of many writers, 110 prosecution is frequently unavailable
because of significant substantive and procedural hurdles.I 1
Evidentiary problems are part of the reason why. State evidence in
terrorism cases often consists of intelligence information.11 2  To be
admitted in criminal trials, this intelligence information must be admissible
under local evidentiary rules, which is sometimes entirely impossible. 113
The United Kingdom, for example, will not accept electronic intercepts as
evidence in a criminal trial, meaning strong evidence as to the intent and
plans of the defendant will not go in front of the fact-finder.11 4 Even where
evidence is admissible, States may have real difficulty exposing that
evidence to the requirement of confrontation without revealing the sources
and methods used to collect the evidence. 115 In the United States, where
106. ICCPR, supra note 83, art. 13; ECHR Protocol 7, supra note 103, art. 1(b)-(c).
107. ICCPR, supra note 83, art. 13.
108. Id.; ECHR Protocol 7, supra note 103, art. 1 ("An alien may be expelled before
[procedural rights are provided] when such expulsion is necessary in the interests of public
order or is grounded on reasons of national security.").
109. See Karker v. France, U.N. Human Rights Comm. (CCPR), No. 833/1998,
Conclusions Under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 1 9.3, U.N. Doc. No. CCPR/C/70/D/833/1998 (2000) (finding no violation of Article
13).
110. See, e.g., Rene Bruin & Kees Wouters, Terrorism and the Non-Derogability ofNon-
Refoulement, 15 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 5, 28 (2003) (arguing prosecutions of terror suspects
alleviate need for refoulement for security reasons); cf RICHARD B. ZABEL & JAMES J.
BENJAMIN JR., IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING TERRORISM CASES IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS (2008) (arguing that federal courts can meet most, if not all, of the detention needs
of the United States in the conflict with al Qaida).
111. See infra notes 112-23 and accompanying text.
112. See Jack Goldsmith, Long Term Terrorist Detention and Our National Security
Court 4 (Brookings Inst., Working Paper of the Series on Counterterrorism and American
Statutory Law, 2009), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2009/0209-
detention goldsmith/0209_detentiongoldsmith.pdf.
113. See id.
114. See Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000, c. 23, § 17 (U.K.) (prohibiting
any evidence in a criminal proceeding that discloses information from electronic intercepts).
Efforts to revise the intercept ban in a way that both protects national security and the right
to a fair trial have failed to date. See LORD CARLILE OF BERRIEw, FIFTH REPORT OF THE
INDEPENDENT REVIEWER PURSUANT TO SECTION 14(3) OF THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM
ACT 2005 21-24 (Feb. 1, 2010) (quoting testimony from Secretary of State for the Home
Department Alan Johnson on the failure of efforts to revise evidentiary rules to allow for
admission of evidence based on intercepts).
115. See ICCPR, supra note 83, art. 14(3)(e) (granting all criminal suspects the right "[t]o
examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him"); ECHR, supra note 7, art. 6(3)(d)
(same); see also American Convention, supra note 103, art. 8(2)(f) (granting all criminal
suspects the right "to examine witnesses present in the court").
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criminal defendants have a constitutional confrontation right, the need to
subject all evidence to confrontation has derailed prosecutions out of fear of
compromising intelligence sources. 116
There must also be a sufficient quantum of evidence to meet the high
burden of proof that exists in criminal trials. Terrorism investigations often
require action before the plot is completed in order to avoid risks to
innocent lives. But the imperative for action can conflict with the need to
collect evidence to meet the burden of proof. In the Naseer case, the threat
that the media would reveal the existence of an investigation compelled the
police to act before the plan to blow up a shopping mall had progressed to a
stage where the police could collect enough evidence to prove a crime had
been committed under British law." 7 The need for early action also means
that detention may occur before the defendant is deemed to have committed
a criminal offense already in the laws of the State at the time the illegal
conduct occurred." 8  This requirement can impede prosecution of terror
suspects.
Non-evidentiary problems exist as well. Criminal offenses sometimes
fail to capture the conduct that is worrisome to the State. In Saadi v.
Italy,119 the Italian government had admissible evidence that the defendant
was in communication with Islamic extremists about plans to attack
unspecified targets in Europe.120 While the government charged Saadi with
conspiracy to commit terrorism, the court reduced the charge because under
Italian law, terrorism requires proof that the target of the attack is not a
participant in an armed conflict.121 The Italians lacked specific enough
evidence of the planned targets for the attack to make a terrorism case.122
Prosecution is also less likely to mitigate permanently the threat the alien
poses to the host State. The issue of incapacitation arises again at the
completion of the sentence, except where a life sentence or death is
imposed. Italian courts convicted Saadi of forgery, and he served a four
and a half year sentence, but Italy was again confronted with how to
116. See Robert M. Chesney, Terrorism, Criminal Prosecution and the Preventive
Detention Debate, 50 S. TEX. L. REV. 669, 708 (2009) (discussing confrontation clause
problems that may arise in terrorism prosecutions). But see United States v. Moussaoui, 382
F.3d 453, 476 (4th Cir. 2004) (allowing the government wide latitude to substitute
unclassified material for requested witness testimony the court believed was material to
defendant's case).
117. See Burns, supra note 1 (explaining that accelerated schedule for raids resulted in
prosecution problems).
118. ICCPR, supra note 83, art. 15 (1); ECHR, supra note 7, art. 7(1); see also American
Convention, supra note 103, art. 9.
119. App. No. 37201/06, 49 Eur. H.R. Rep. 730 (2008).
120. See id. at 736.
121. See id. at 734-35.
122. See id. (describing judgment of Assize Court dismissing terrorism charges because
"it was not known whether the violent acts which the applicant and his accomplices were
preparing to commit. . . were to be part of an armed conflict or not").
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mitigate his threat at the end of the sentence.123 By contrast, once
repatriated an alien may be restricted from further access to the State. 124
These difficulties with criminal prosecution have led many scholars, 125
and some States, 126 to suggest that administrative detention, or detention
based on the future dangerousness of a terrorist suspect, be made available.
But States may find administrative detention an unappealing alternative to
repatriation of aliens for at least three reasons.
First, administrative detention is not permitted under some human rights
instruments, except in exceptional circumstances. The ECHR has been
interpreted to prohibit administrative detention for security purposes, 127
except where the requirements for derogation are met. 128
Second, while expulsion is by definition limited to aliens, it is difficult to
similarly cabin administrative detention to a particular population or type of
conduct. In A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department,129 the British
House of Lords struck down an immigration law permitting indefinite
detention pending deportation where the Secretary of State certifies that the
alien is a suspected terrorist, and that his presence threatens the national
security of the United Kingdom. 130 Because the ECHR does not permit
indefinite administrative detention pending deportation, 131 the British
123. See id. at 734.
124. See, e.g., Joel Brinkley, From Afghanistan to Saudi Arabia, via Guantcinamo, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 16, 2004, at A4 (noting that Yaser E. Hamdi was required to "renounce his
American citizenship" as a condition of his repatriation to Saudi Arabia after the U.S.
Supreme Court granted him the right to challenge his detention in court).
125. See Goldsmith, supra note 112, at 4-5 (arguing in favor of administrative detention
where criminal prosecution is not possible). See generally Monica Hakimi, International
Standards for Detaining Terrorism Suspects: Moving Beyond the Armed Conflict Criminal
Divide, 33 YALE J. INT'L L. 369 (2008) (arguing that administrative detention is a tool for
combating terrorism consistent with human rights law).
126. In his speech at the National Archives in May 2009, President Obama argued that
the United States needed to consider new detention authority to prevent the "release [ofj
individuals who endanger the American people." President Barack Obama, Remarks by the
President on National Security (May 21, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/Remarks-by-the-President-On-National-
Security-5-21-09/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2011). To that end Obama proposed that Congress
authorize a legal regime that would allow for detention without criminal charge, but with
legal process including periodic review. Id. To date nothing has come of the Obama
proposal.
127. See Hakimi, supra note 125, at 392 (summarizing ECtHR jurisprudence interpreting
Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights).
128. See Lawless v. Ireland (No. 3), 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1 48 (1961) (upholding Irish
law allowing for security detention without trial based on proper invocation of Article 15
derogation from Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights). Article 15 allows
for derogation "[i]n time of war or other public emergency [that] threaten[s] the life of the
nation." ECHR, supra note 7, art. 15. It is doubtful that all conflicts with non-State actors
that are the subject of this Article would meet this standard.
129. [2004] UKHL 56 (appeal taken from Eng.).
130. See id at [73]; see also Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24, § 23
(U.K.) (granting government the power to detain "suspected international terrorist[s]"
indefinitely pending deportation where non-refoulement prevents actual expulsion).
131. See ECHR, supra note 7, art. 5(1)(f) ("No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in
the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: the lawful arrest
or detention of a person. . . against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or
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attempted to derogate from Article 5.132 The Law Lords rejected the
derogation because they did not believe the immigration provision was
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.133 The Lords refused to
accept indefinite detention pending deportation because British nationals
suspected of terrorism were subjected to less restrictive means, such as
monitoring and restrictions on movement, to manage their threat.134 The
difficulty in cabining administrative detention has led many human rights
advocates to oppose the scheme on grounds it will displace criminal
prosecution over time. 135
Third, even the more lenient procedural requirements for administrative
detention may be too onerous to meet. For example, unlike expulsion, the
procedural requirements for administrative detention are not subject to
security waiver, unless the conditions for derogation from human rights
obligations exist. 136
Thus, without repatriation States may be left with no way to physically
counteract the threat posed by a dangerous alien. Human rights groups and
scholars have suggested third country resettlement as the solution to the
problems created by non-refoulement protection.137  However, recent
attempts to repatriate detainees from Guantanamo Bay demonstrate the
futility of depending upon States to accept non-nationals for resettlement,
especially where the detainee is believed to be dangerous.138 It is difficult
to conceive of the incentives for a State to accept potentially dangerous
aliens for resettlement. States motivated to accept such aliens on
humanitarian grounds may be dissuaded by diplomatic pressure from the
extradition."); see also R v. Governor of Durham Prison (Ex parte Hardial Singh), (1984) 1
W.L.R. 704 (Q.B.) at 706 (Eng.) (interpreting Article 5 as permitting detention only for so
long as "reasonably necessary" to effect deportation).
132. See A, [2004] UKHL at [I1] (describing derogation order).
133. Id. at [44].
134. Id. at [35], [44], [155].
135. See generally Gabor Rona, Legal Frameworks to Combat Terrorism: An Abundant
Inventory ofExisting Tools, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 499 (2005).
136. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 83, art. 9.
137. See, e.g., Gillard, supra note 37, at 738 (arguing third country resettlement is
solution to security problems created by non-refoulement); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-
FATED HOMECOMINGS: A TUNISIAN CASE STUDY OF GUANTANAMO REPATRIATIONS 27 (2007)
(calling on Bush Administration to close Guantanamo detention facility through third
country resettlement).
138. See Dan Ephron, Life After Gitmo, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 25, 2008, 7:00 PM)
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2008/11/25/life-after-gitmo.html (interviewing
author on difficulties of third country resettlement from Guantanamo). The Obama
Administration has resettled more detainees in third countries, but has not found homes for
all of the detainees who cannot be repatriated to their home countries. See Peter Finn, Wolf
Criticizes Counterterrorism Nominee over Detainee-Resettlement Plans, WASH. POST., July
15, 2011, at A7 (noting that "[t]he Obama Administration has repatriated or resettled in third
countries 67 detainees"); The Guantanamo Docket, N.Y. TIMES,
http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees (last visited Sept. 21, 2011) (reporting
171 detainees remain at Guantanamo Bay).
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State of nationality of the alien.139 States already reluctant to take such a
step do not need much diplomatic arm-twisting to decline to do so.
Thus, removing repatriation from the table often leaves States resorting
to measures like control orders to mitigate the risk posed by dangerous
aliens. Control orders are parole-like restrictions imposed on a terrorism
suspect in order to protect the public from the suspect. The United
Kingdom authorized a system of control orders in the Prevention of
Terrorism Act of 2005,140 and they have been used by other States as
well.141 Restrictions imposed include curfews, restrictions on
communication and travel, and the right of the police to search the suspect's
premises on demand.142
Despite the potential of control orders, they have proven ineffective, at
least in the United Kingdom. HMG has found it difficult to design lawful
control orders because of the numerous restrictions imposed by the ECHR.
Control orders must not be so onerous as to amount to a deprivation of
liberty without derogation from the ECHR.143 And they may only be
imposed if the terrorism suspect is provided "knowledge of the essence of
the case against him,"144 requiring the State to rely on information it can
share with the suspect. These restrictions have led HMG to question
whether control orders provide any practical advantages to national
security.1 45  Forty-five individuals since 2005 have been subjected to
control orders, with seven individuals having absconded, and six more
having their control orders quashed by the courts. 146 Former Home Office
Secretary Tony McNulty acknowledged the limited efficacy of control
orders, calling them "a second best option" to protect the public.147
Thus, the threat of terrorist acts perpetrated by aliens increases the
security consequences of granting non-refoulement protection. When aliens
may not be repatriated, detention, whether criminal, pursuant to ongoing
139. See, e.g., Julian E. Barnes, Palau Deal May Not End Uighur Issue, L.A. TIMES, June
11, 2009, at A16 (reporting that China had "pressured other countries not to take the
Uighurs").
140. See Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, c. 2, § 1(1) (U.K.) ("'[C]ontrol order' means
an order against an individual that imposes obligations on him for purposes connected with
protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism.").
141. See COLUMBIA LAW SCH. HUMAN RIGHTS INST., PROMISES TO KEEP: DIPLOMATIC
ASSURANCES AGAINST TORTURE IN U.S. TERRORISM TRANSFERS 91 (2010) (detailing
Canada's use of similar measures).
142. See Prevention of Terrorism Act § 1(4) (listing potential restrictions imposed by
control orders).
143. For example, HMG may impose a curfew of up to sixteen hours per day, but no
longer. See Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't. v. JJ, [2007] UKHL 45, [105] (appeal taken
from Eng.) (describing it as "clear" that curfews up to 16 hours are compatible with Article
5, while those longer than 16 hours are not).
144. See Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't. v. AF, [2009] UKHL 28, [65] (appeal taken
from Eng.) (interpreting ECtHR decision in A v. United Kingdom).
145. CARLILE, supra note 114, at 63-64 (reprinting letter from Home Secretary to Lord
Carlile requesting consideration of whether control orders had use after AF).
146. Id. at 6-8.
147. PM Hits Back over Terror Suspect Escapes, POLITICS.CO.UK (Oct. 17, 2006, 12:00
AM), http://www.politics.co.uk/News/domestic-policy/crime/terrorism/control-orders-
reviewed-after-terror-suspects-escape-$454849.htm.
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immigration proceedings, or preventive, may not be available. 148 Third
country resettlement and release with conditions may also be unachievable
or ineffective alternatives. 149
Of course, this result merely places aliens in the same situation as citizen
terrorist suspects. As discussed above, the Law Lords in A saw no
legitimate reason for treating aliens differently from citizens in this
regard.15 0 What the Law Lords overlook, however, is that aliens, unlike
citizens, have no legal right to remain within the State. While States
grudgingly accept the threat posed by nationals as a price for maintaining
cherished civil liberties, such a price is far steeper where the individual in
question has traditionally been removable from the State. Indeed, the
magnitude of the threat involved with acts of terrorism makes it difficult for
States to bear additional risk to protect dangerous aliens. Because
international law largely depends upon voluntary compliance, States have
many options to evade disfavored rules, as will be described in the next
section.
C. States Push Back
Given the security problems created through enforcement of the non-
refoulement rule, it is not surprising that States have sought to mitigate the
resulting security consequences. They have done so in part by pushing
human rights bodies to accept the right of States to expel aliens despite the
threat of post-transfer mistreatment where the alien threatens State
security.151  These efforts have been unsuccessful. Human rights
institutions view non-refoulement as a bulwark against erosion of the jus
cogens torture norm and are skeptical of the ability of human rights law to
account for State security interests.152 With the current rule entrenched,
some States have taken steps to protect their security interests that are
inconsistent with the spirit or even letter of human rights law, moves which
are ultimately harmful to human rights.153
States long have resisted embracing the full import of non-refoulement
protections where difficult security consequences result. For example, the
United States takes the position that only express treaty obligations can
confer non-refoulement rights, rejecting the implication of such duties from
more general treaty provisions. This position means the United States does
not recognize a non-refoulement obligation with respect to transfers to
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or other lesser forms of
mistreatment. 154 The United States also rejects the Committee Against
148. See supra notes 110-34 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
150. See A v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2004] UKHL 56, [44] (appeal taken
from Eng.) (striking down British preventive detention law targeting alien terrorist suspects
on grounds that it was unreasonable to treat alien and citizen terrorist suspects differently).
151. See infra notes 154-71 and accompanying text.
152. See infra notes 179-82 and accompanying text.
153. See infra notes 183-203 and accompanying text.
154. The United States rejected the HRC's interpretation of ICCPR Article 7. In support
of its view it explained that the vigorous debate over the later-in-time, narrower non-
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Torture's view that CAT Article 3 applies to transfers not originating in the
United States.155 The U.S. positions on these issues are offered as technical
disagreements with the human rights community about negotiating history
and methods of interpretation of treaty provisions, consistent with the
positivist approach to international law employed by the United States. But
the security considerations of accepting broader non-refoulement
obligations are a prime policy motivation for the U.S. position.
The aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks has intensified efforts by other
States to seek modifications to the non-refoulement rule. These efforts
have generally been rebuffed by the human rights apparatus. Several
European States, including the United Kingdom and Portugal, sought
reconsideration of the ECtHR ruling in Chahal that there were no security
exceptions to the non-refoulement rule in Saadi.156 Italy had evidence that
Saadi was connected with Islamic terrorists, and sought to deport him home
to Tunisia after he completed his criminal sentence in Italy.157 Saadi
argued that his deportation to Tunisia would violate Article 3 of the ECHR
because of the real risk he would be tortured after his return. 158 The United
Kingdom intervened, arguing that Chahal wrongly ignored the obligation of
States to protect their population from the threat posed by terrorists. 159
Instead, HMG submitted that the court permit States to weigh the threat
posed by the person being transferred in its non-refoulement assessment,
perhaps by raising the threshold of evidence of mistreatment that must be
demonstrated in cases where the individual poses a real threat to the State
where he is located. 160
The ECtHR in Saadi fully affirmed its decision in Chahal. After noting
the real threat terrorism posed to state security, the court repeated the
simple premise that underlies Chahal: since ECHR Article 3 provides an
refoulement obligation in the CAT demonstrated that the ICCPR did not already include a
broad obligation in the area. See U.S. Dep't of State, List of Issues to Be Taken Up in
Connection with the Consideration of the Second and Third Periodic Reports of the United
States of America 17-19, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/AdvanceDocs/
USA-writtenreplies.pdf.
155. The United States argues the CAT Article 3 lacks the clear indicia of extraterritorial
application included in other provisions of the treaty. See U.S. Dep't of State, List of Issues
to Be Considered During the Examination of the Second Periodic Report of the United States
of America: Response of the United States of America 34, http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/124126.pdf. The U.S. Supreme Court has adopted this for an
identical term in the Refugee Convention. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155,
179 (1993) (holding that the "text and negotiating history of Article 33 [of the Refugee
Convention] affirmatively indicate that it was not intended to have extraterritorial effect").
156. 49 Eur. H.R. Rep. 730 (2009). The brief calling for overruling Chahal was initially
filed in Ramzy v. Netherlands, but the arguments were later made in Saadi because that case
came in front of the ECtHR first. See generally Observations, supra note 23.
157. See Saadi, 49 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 734-37. Italy had charged Saadi with conspiracy to
commit acts of terrorism, but the trial court rejected that charge. See id. at 734. Under Italian
law terrorism requires proof that the target of the planned violence is not a participant in an
armed conflict, and the government introduced insufficient evidence regarding the target of
the plan to prove this point. See id at 734-35.
158. See id. at 752-53.
159. See id. at 756-57.
160. See id at 757-58.
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absolute prohibition on torture and inhuman and degrading treatment by
State Parties, non-refoulement protection must also be absolute.161 No
consideration may be made of any factors not related to threat of post-
transfer mistreatment. Because the threat the detainee poses to the State
that seeks expulsion does not affect the risk of mistreatment after transfer,
the ECtHR held that this factor may not be considered.162
Canada, by contrast, has gained some traction with the Canadian
Supreme Court with the argument that its security interests are relevant to
the determination of whether to provide non-refoulement protection.
Canadian immigration law permits deportation "to a country where a
person's life or freedom would be threatened" based on a determination that
a person "constitutes a danger to the security of Canada."1 63 In Suresh v.
Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration),164 Canada sought to
deport Suresh to his native Sri Lanka because his involvement in the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a terrorist group seeking an
independent Tamil homeland in Sri Lanka, threatened the security of
Canada.165 Suresh sought to block his deportation on grounds that he faced
torture if returned to Sri Lanka because of his affiliation with the LTTE.166
Suresh argued that deportation where substantial risk of torture exists
violates the right to life protected in the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms. 167
The Canadian Supreme Court held that the Canadian Charter permitted
balancing the State's interest in combating terrorism against Suresh's
constitutional right not be transferred to face torture.168 While the court
recognized that "barring extraordinary circumstances, deportation to
torture" was impermissible, it refused to exclude the possibility that such
161. See id. at 761 ("Since protection against the treatment prohibited by art. 3 is
absolute, that provision imposes a[] [non-refoulement] obligation ... [for] any person who,
in the receiving country, would run the real risk of being subjected to such treatment.").
162. See id. ("The prospect that he may pose a serious threat to the community if not
returned does not reduce in any way the degree of risk of ill treatment . . . .").
163. Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-2, § 53 (Can.) ("[No person] . . . shall be
removed from Canada to a country where the [person's] life or freedom is threatened . . .
unless . . . the person is [reasonably believed to be engaged in terrorism or part of an
organization engaged in terrorism] and the Minister is of the opinion that the person
constitutes a danger to the security of Canada."), repealed and replaced by Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (effective June 28, 2002). A person whose removal
on June 28, 2002 was allowed by section 53(l)(a) to (d) of the former Immigration Act is a
person referred to in section 115(2) of the new Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. See
Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227, § 326(3) (Can.).
164. [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3 (Can.).
165. See id. para. 1.
166. See id. paras. 15, 42.
167. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11, pt. 1, § 7 (U.K.) ("Everyone has the right
to life, liberty and the security of person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.").
168. See Suresh, 1 S.C.R., para. 58 (explaining that Canadian law balances the state's
interest in combating terrorism against its "constitutional commitment to liberty and fair
process").
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circumstances existed.169 "The ambit of an exceptional discretion to deport
to torture, if any," the court explained, "must await future cases." 170 The
court acknowledged that this decision was contrary to international law. 171
Nevertheless, lower Canadian courts have yet to find "exceptional
circumstances" where transfers are permitted despite the substantial risk of
torture. Courts have avoided reaching the balancing analysis in most cases,
instead reversing the factual determinations underlying the government's
removal decision. 172
In the one case where the lower court has directly engaged in Suresh
balancing, it refused to authorize deportation. The lower court upheld the
finding of the Canadian government that Mahmoud Es Sayyid Jaballah
facilitated communications that assisted in the 1998 U.S. Embassy
bombings in Tanzania and Kenya, trained in al Qaida camps, and was in
active contact with senior al Qaida leaders in Canada, the United Kingdom,
and Yemen.173 But the Court refused to authorize his deportation to Egypt
where there was a substantial risk of torture because his case did not rise to
the level of "exceptional circumstances" mandated by Suresh.174 The Court
believed such circumstances did not exist because Jaballah did not himself
commit acts of violence.175
Despite the unwillingness of the lower Canadian courts to authorize
deportation using the Suresh rule, the reaction of the human rights treaty
bodies to the Suresh decision has been overwhelmingly negative. In 2005,
the HRC criticized the decision as a violation of Article 7 of the ICCPR.176
In its concluding observations to Canada, the HRC wrote,
[n]o person, without any exception, even those suspected of presenting a
danger to national security or the safety of any person, and even during a
state of emergency, may be deported to a country where he/she runs the
risk of being subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment. 177
That same year the Committee Against Torture specifically criticized
Suresh, writing, "The Committee expresses its concern at: [t]he failure of
the Supreme Court of Canada, in [Suresh] . . . to recognize . .. the absolute
169. Id. para. 76.
170. Id. para. 78.
171. See id. para. 75 ("We conclude that ... international law rejects deportation to
torture, even where national security interests are at stake.").
172. See, e.g., Mahjoub v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2005] 3
F.C.R. 334, para. 54 (Can.) (refusing to accept Immigration Ministry's finding that Mahjoub
posed a threat to Canada without evidence that the Minister had independently reviewed
intelligence information, including source material).
173. See In re Jaballah, [2006] F.C. 1230, paras. 39-55 (Can.).
174. See id. paras. 81-84.
175. Id. paras. 81-82.
176. See U.N. Human Rights Comm. (CCPR), Report of the Human Rights Committee,
para. 15, U.N. Doc. A/61/40 (2006).
177. Id.
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nature of the protection of article 3 of the Convention, which is not subject
to any exception whatsoever." 78
Similarly, the limited scholarship examining Suresh has criticized the
decision for refusing to categorically exclude the possibility of transfer
where the risk of torture exists. 179  This scholarship conflates non-
refoulement with thejus cogens duty not to torture, and therefore fears that
Suresh undermines the anti-torture norm.180  Scholars have also been
skeptical of the ability of the Canadian government to balance the relevant
equities fairly, fearing that the government will prefer security interests to
the human rights of the transferee, thereby expanding the exception.18'
This skepticism is fueled by the specter of extraordinary rendition, defined
in this context as transfer for the purpose of interrogation using torture. 182
Given the unwillingness of the human rights community and some States
to reconsider the scope of non-refoulement protection, States have resorted
to behavioral adaptations that have negative second-order human rights
effects to avoid the security consequences of non-refoulement. In some
instances States have been unwilling to capture dangerous aliens out of fear
that they could not be repatriated after capture. European navies have
released suspected pirates captured off the coast of Somalia back onto their
ships or onto Somali beaches out of concern that they would be unable to
repatriate them if taken prisoner because of torture concerns. 183 The British
have gone further still and instructed their ships not to capture pirates at all,
out of fear that they could claim the right to remain in the United Kingdom
if brought onboard the ship or to British soil for trial. 184 While these
178. U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties
Under Article 19 of the Convention: Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee
Against Torture: Canada, 4(a), U.N. Doc. CAT/C/CR/34/CAN (July 7, 2005).
179. See Kent Roach, Constitutional, Remedial and International Dialogues About
Rights: The Canadian Experience, 40 TEX. INT'L L.J. 537, 572 (2005) (arguing that it would
have been preferable for the Canadian Supreme Court to follow established international
law).
180. See Robert J. Currie, Charter Without Borders? The Supreme Court of Canada,
Transnational Crime and Constitutional Rights and Freedoms, 27 DALHOUSIE L.J. 235, 259
(2004) (arguing against distinction between negative obligation not to torture and non-
refoulement protection); David Jenkins, Rethinking Suresh: Refoulement to Torture Under
Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 47 ALTA. L. REv. 125, 127 (2009) (criticizing
Suresh for undermining "international peremptory norm against torture and the concomitant
protective principle of non-refoulement").
181. Currie, supra note 180, at 260 (criticizing balancing test for giving too much weight
to security concerns); Jenkins, supra note 180, at 132-33 (raising concerns about willingness
of Canadian government to expand Suresh to dangerous aliens not involved in terrorism).
182. Jenkins, supra note 180, at 151 ("[R]endition shows that the principle of non-
refoulement must be absolutely respected as an outgrowth of jus cogens, so that countries
cannot unscrupulously avoid their obligation not to inflict torture directly by 'shopping out'
or 'out-sourcing' the dirty work to other willing countries.").
183. See Tullio Treves, Human Rights and the Law of the Sea, 28 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 1,
13 (2010) (describing release of pirates by a Danish naval vessel due to non-refoulement
concerns).
184. See Marie Woolf, Pirates Can Claim UK Asylum, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Apr. 13,
2008, at 1 (explaining Foreign Office instruction to the Royal Navy). Julian Brazier,
Conservative MP, criticized the British policy to not capture pirates in Somalia, saying,
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policies protect the European public from the risk that captured pirates are
freed in Europe, the significant costs of this decision are borne by
merchants and ship crews plying the Red Sea, and Somalis terrorized by the
released pirates back on shore.
More perniciously, States have puffed the effectiveness of diplomatic
assurances to argue that they may repatriate individuals consistent with
their non-refoulement duties.185 Diplomatic assurances are promises
obtained from the receiving State that they will not torture or otherwise
mistreat detainees. 186  Assurances are designed to reduce the risk of
mistreatment such that transfer is still permissible under international
law.' 8 7 Major European States, including the United Kingdom, Italy and
Spain, as well as Canada and the United States, employ diplomatic
assurances regularly. 188
Generally these assurances are obtained from States with poor human
rights records, which have a history of mistreating transferees. 189 Human
rights groups are critical of diplomatic assurances because the States asked
to give assurances have already violated international commitments not to
mistreat their people.190 These groups ask why these bilateral promises are
any more likely to be followed. Advocates of assurances respond that
promises from high-ranking foreign ministry or interior ministry officials to
their U.S., Canadian, or European counterparts may influence the State's
behavior more than multilateral treaty commitments. 19 1 In the past I have
written that assurances can reduce the risk of post-transfer mistreatment
where they are standardized, evaluated by appropriate country experts
within a State's foreign ministry, actively monitored, and accompanied by a
political commitment to ensure that they are followed. 192
"These people commit horrendous offences. The solution is to turn them over to the local
authorities. It's a pathetic indictment of our legal system." Id. at 1.
185. The United Kingdom has actively promoted diplomatic assurances as an effective
"way forward" to comply with non-refoulement while protecting its public. See JULIA HALL,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NOT THE WAY FORWARD: THE UK's DANGEROUS RELIANCE ON
DIPLOMATIC ASSURANCES 25-27 (Joanne Mariner et al. eds., 2008) (describing efforts by the
British to convince other European states to embrace deportation with assurances).
186. See id at 1.
187. The CAT, for example, permits transfers so long as there are not "substantial
grounds" to believe the individual will be tortured. CAT, supra note 84, art. 3. Assurances
may allow the State to assess that there are no longer "substantial grounds" to believe the
transferee will be tortured, even if the risk is greater than zero. See id.
188. JULIA HALL, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, STILL AT RISK: DIPLOMATIC ASSURANCES No
SAFEGUARD AGAINST TORTURE 3-4 (Rachel Denber et al. eds., 2005).
189. Id. at 18-19.
190. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE STAMP OF GUANTANAMO: THE STORY OF
SEVEN MEN BETRAYED BY RUSSIA'S DIPLOMATIC ASSURANCES TO THE UNITED STATES (2007)(arguing that mistreatment of detainees after their transfer from Guantanamo Bay
demonstrates ineffectiveness of diplomatic assurances).
191. John B. Bellinger III & Vijay M. Padmanabhan, Detention Operations in
Contemporary Conflicts: Four Challenges for the Geneva Conventions and Other Existing
Law, 105 AM. J. INT'L L. 201, 239 (2011).
192. See id at 239-40. For a comprehensive understanding of the difficult issues
surrounding diplomatic assurances, see generally ASHLEY S. DEEKS, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS, AVOIDING TRANSFERS TO TORTURE (2008).
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But the risks associated with providing non-refoulement protection
motivate States to rely upon assurances they know are faulty. A Columbia
Law School Human Rights Institute report concluded that the United States
is more likely to use assurances where it has no tenable alternatives to
mitigate the threat posed by dangerous aliens.193 Take the case of Maher
Arar, a Canadian-Syrian dual national, whom the United States suspected of
involvement with al Qaida when it detained him at Kennedy Airport in
2002.194 U.S. officials were reluctant to release Arar to Canada, his country
of residence, because Canadian officials indicated they had no legal
authority to detain him if he returned. U.S. officials feared Arar would use
the porous U.S.-Canadian border to re-enter the country to commit terrorist
attacks. 195 Rather than bear this risk, the United States decided to remove
Arar to Syria, pursuant to an immigration law permitting fast-track removal
of dangerous aliens.196 While that law prohibited transfer where it violated
U.S. non-refoulement duties under the CAT, the United States claimed the
transfer to Syria complied with this requirement, citing assurances received
from the Syrian government. 197  The United States credited these
assurances despite Syria's notorious history of torturing suspected Islamic
radicals, and the poor state of U.S.-Syrian relations that made enforcing
assurances difficult.198 Tragically, Arar was tortured by Syrian officials,
and Canada subsequently cleared him of any involvement with radical
Islamic groups.199
The Arar case is not unique. In 2002, the United States deported
suspected Islamic radical Nabil Soliman to Egypt.200 His removal had been
deferred for many years due to fears of post-transfer mistreatment, but in
the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks that deferral was lifted on the basis of
assurances from Egypt. 201 Soliman was held incommunicado in Egypt for
seven weeks after his return, and the U.S. Embassy in Cairo could not
confirm that he had not been tortured. 202 Similarly, the United Kingdom
persisted with deporting terrorist suspects to Algeria pursuant to diplomatic
assurances despite reports from detainees who had been repatriated
previously that they had been tortured, dismissing those complaints as less
reliable than promises from the Algerian government. 203
193. COLUMBIA LAW SCH. HUMAN RIGHTS INST., supra note 141, at 31.
194. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG-08-18,
THE REMOVAL OF A CANADIAN CITIZEN TO SYRIA 6 (2008).
195. See id at 12, 21; see also Scott Shane, The Costs of Outsourcing Interrogation: A
Canadian Muslim's Long Ordeal in Syria, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2005, at 10 (quoting U.S.
officials explaining they could not risk Arar's release in Canada after the 9/11 attacks).
196. See Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c)(2) (2006) (permitting
Attorney General to designate aliens for removal without proceedings in front of an
immigration judge).
197. See Shane, supra note 195, at 10 (quoting testimony by former Attorney General
John Ashcroft).
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. See Soliman v. United States, 296 F.3d 1237, 1239-40 (11th Cir. 2002).
201. See id. at 1241-42 (summarizing facts in case).
202. COLUMBIA LAW SCH. HUMAN RIGHTS INST., supra note 141, at 49.
203. See id. at 82-83 (detailing actions by HMG and SIAC in the case).
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These cases reveal an important reality regarding non-refoulement
protection. Even as human rights bodies have held the line against any
exceptions to the non-refoulement duty, States concerned about the security
consequences of the rule found alternative methods to protect their
population. This result is not surprising; as Thomas Franck has explained,
rules that produce outcomes at the margins that are viewed as unjust lose
some of the legitimacy required to entice voluntary compliance. 204 But
these State workarounds have important second-order negative
repercussions for human rights, which raises questions about the
desirability and viability of the current rule.
II. DUTY TO PROTECT: REFRAMING THE NON-REFOULEMENT DEBATE
A. Understanding the Protection Competition
The non-refoulement debate has reached an impasse. From the
perspective of human rights bodies, like the ECtHR in Saadi, non-
refoulement is inseparable from the right to be free from torture or cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment, which is absolute. 205 Even if human
rights law wanted to account for security interests, these are viewed as
outside the ambit of human rights law. 206 This leads to the accusation that
seeking to balance individual rights with security interests in transfer
assessments compares apples to oranges. 207 From the perspective of States,
a human rights framework that fails to account for the fundamental
obligation of States to secure the safety of their people is untenable, not the
least because of political pressures to do so. Because international law for
the most part depends upon voluntary state enforcement, an untenable rule
results in State evasion.
This Article contends that this stand-off is due in significant part to a
failure to appreciate the human rights competition at issue in transfer
determinations regarding dangerous aliens. The traditional conception of
human rights is that they entail negative duties: the State shall avoid
actions that constitute a deprivation of the right. 208 U.S. domestic and
international legal interpretation has generally viewed human rights in this
way.209 In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social
Services,210 the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a claim that the State had a
constitutional duty to protect a boy from abuse by his father when it knew
204. See FRANCK, supra note 41, at 84 (discussing compliance problems for "idiot rules").
205. See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
206. See supra ntoes 176-78 and accompanying text.
207. See infra note 267 and accompanying text.
208. See SHUE, supra note 33, at 35-36, 52-53.
209. Criminal law is a major exception, as U.S. law recognizes affirmative governmental
duties to effectuate the right to a fair trial, such as government provision of counsel to the
indigent. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938) (holding that the Sixth
Amendment includes a government duty to provide counsel to the indigent for criminal
trial).
210. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
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or should have known of the danger. 211 The Court held that all due process
requires is that the State not deprive an individual of a protected interest,
not that it take any affirmative steps to prevent private deprivations of
rights. 212 This limited conception of rights is reflected in U.S. tort law by
the public duty doctrine, which limits government liability for failure to
protect to situations where the State itself created the danger at issue. 213
And it is espoused regularly by the United States in rejecting human rights
that require the State to take positive fulfillment measures, such as most
economic, social and cultural rights. 214
Henry Shue's important book Basic Rights,215 however, rejects this
limited American conception of rights. He instead argues that fulfillment of
basic rights requires positive action from States, including the duty to
protect those within their jurisdictions from violations committed by
others. 216 Shue explains that it would make little sense to speak of a right
to physical security, for example, if the State allowed others free reign to
violate that security. 217  Such a duty is in accordance with the
understanding that a primary purpose of the State is to create the structures
required to prevent one member of society or institution from harming
another. 218 Human rights bodies, 219 treaties, 220 and most human rights
211. See id. at 191.
212. Id. at 195-96.
213. See Helen Gugel, Remaking the Mold: Pursuing Failure to Protect Claims Under
State Constitutions via Analogous Bivens Actions, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1294, 1312-13
(2010) (describing impediment to right to protect claims under U.S. state tort law).
214. See, e.g., Tony P. Hall, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Agencies for Food and
Agriculture, U.S. Opening Statement at the Food and Agriculture Organization Right to
Food Forum (Oct. 1-3, 2008), http://www.fao.org/righttofood/rtf forum/files/Right%
20to%20food%20statement.pdf (describing right to food as a "goal or aspiration" not giving
rise to "any international obligation or domestic legal entitlement").
215. See SHUE, supra note 33, at 52.
216. See id at 37-40.
217. See id.
218. Id. at 56. For a good primer on political theory supporting the view that protection
of citizens is a primary purpose of the State, see generally Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty
of Government: Protection, Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507
(1991).
219. See Veldsquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 4, 172 (July 29, 1988) (holding that Article 1(1) of the American Convention
includes a positive obligation "to prevent, investigate and punish" human rights violations
committed by private actors); General Comment No. 31, supra note 83, T 8 (expressing view
that Article 2(1) of the ICCPR includes obligation "to take appropriate measures or to
exercise due diligence to prevent, punish, investigate or redress" violations of the Covenant);
A.R. MOWBRAY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 6 (2004)
(explaining that ECtHR has recognized State "duties to protect persons from the violation of
their Convention rights from both other private individuals and public officials").
220. See, e.g., International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, art. 2(d), Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 ("Each State Party shall prohibit
and bring to an end, by all appropriate means, including legislation as required by
circumstances, racial discrimination by any persons, group or organization.").
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scholars 221 accept that satisfying human rights obligations mandates
protection against violations committed by actors other than the State.
The duty to protect provides the intellectual architecture for non-
refoulement protection. 222 As discussed in the previous part, a major
development in human rights law of the last thirty years has been
recognition of an obligation not to transfer someone where there is a
substantial risk of being subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment. 223 While human rights bodies such as ECtHR and the HRC have
failed to provide much in the way of meaningful analysis to justify
implication of such a duty, especially in the face of evidence such
protection was not contemplated during drafting, understanding non-
refoulement as a duty to protect provides the normative foundation for their
interpretation. The obligation not to torture or seriously mistreat imposes
upon States a negative duty to avoid torturing or mistreating anyone. But
fully effectuating the right also requires protecting the individual from the
torture or mistreatment by others. Non-refoulement is State protection from
torture or mistreatment perpetrated by the receiving State.224
Shue's analysis of duties also explains the pressure to expand the
categories of post-transfer mistreatment that merit non-refoulement
protection. Because fulfilling human rights mandates State protection
against the violation of those rights by others, expansion of non-
refoulement duties is inevitable as the law seeks to deepen rights
fulfillment. This development is already occurring. As noted above, the
Enforced Disappearances Convention includes a non-refoulement
221. See Thomas Buergenthal, To Respect and to Ensure: State Obligations and
Permissible Derogations, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL
AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 72, 77-78 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981) (arguing that Article 2(1) of the
ICCPR requires States to protect against rights violations committed by non-State actors);
SARAH JOSEPH ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS:
CASES, MATERIALS, AND COMMENTARY 24 (2000) (same).
222. See Monica Hakimi, State Bystander Responsibility, 21 EUR. J. INT'L L. 341, 366
(2010) (discussing the characteristics of non-refoulement as a manifestation of the duty to
protect).
223. See supra notes 70-97 and accompanying text.
224. Not all instances where non-refoulement protection is implicated fall within the duty
to protect. During the Bush Administration, the United States engaged in a practice of
extraordinary rendition, in which aliens were transferred from one State to another for the
purpose of interrogation using torture. See Charlie Savage, Obama's War on Terror May
Resemble Bush's in Some Areas, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2009, at A20. Rendition involves
intent on the part of the transferring State that the receiving State mistreats the individual,
usually to obtain information. Such intent means the transferring State incurs responsibility
under international law for its complicity in the wrongful act of the receiving State under the
principle that a State may not do through another that which it could not do itself See Draft
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 16 in Rep. of the
Int'l Law Comm'n, 53d Sess., Apr. 23-June 1, July 2-Aug. 10, 2001, at 43, 47, U.N. Doc.
A/56/10; GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001) (placing responsibility on State for
assistance with the wrongful acts of another State where that assistance is provided with "a
view to facilitating the commission of [the] act"); id. art. 17 (imposing State responsibility
for wrongful acts of other States where State directed and controlled wrongful act). In those
instances, the transferring State is implicated in the commission of torture or other serious
forms of mistreatment, thereby violating its absolute duty to avoid committing such acts, as
opposed to its duty to protect from those acts committed by others. See id art 16.
104 [Vol. 80
HeinOnline  -- 80 Fordham L. Rev. 104 2011-2012
TO TRANSFER OR NOT TO TRANSFER
obligation, 225 and other human rights bodies are locating non-refoulement
duties in ostensibly negative treatment prohibitions. 226
While this protection duty is well-established in the law, less
acknowledged is the competing protection duty at issue in transfer of
dangerous aliens. Human rights law has in recent years recognized that the
State has a duty to protect the public not only from rights violations
committed by other States, but also from rights violations committed by
private persons within society which it knows or should know are likely to
occur. The ECtHR first recognized this duty in its landmark decision in
Osman v. United Kingdom.227 In that case plaintiffs argued that the British
police violated the right to life of a family member when it failed to take
adequate preventive measures to stop a deranged man from killing the
family member despite clear warnings regarding the threat. 228 The United
Kingdom denied it owed such a broad duty to protect against actions
committed by members of society, arguing instead it could only be held
liable where the police "assumed responsibility" for the safety of the
individual.229 The Court rejected the British position, holding the right to
life includes positive State duties to safeguard the lives of those within its
jurisdiction. The Court explained that the State has a duty to take
''preventive operational measures" to combat threats where "the authorities
knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and
immediate risk to the life of an identified individual or individuals from the
criminal acts of a third party." 230 The Court remarked that the operational
measures required went beyond merely creating a criminal justice apparatus
to deal with threats, instead sometimes requiring action to mitigate the
threat. 231
While Osman involved a threat to an identified individual, the ECtHR
has held this duty extends to society at large. In Mastromatteo v. Italy,232
the petitioner claimed that Italy violated his son's right to life when it
released habitual offenders from prison before the termination of their
sentence, and they in turn killed his son.233 The Court noted that this claim
was different from Osman in that the police were not alleged to know that
Mastromatteo himself was in danger, but rather should have known the
released prisoners posed a danger to society in general. 234 The Court
extended Osman and held that the State has a duty to do "all that could be
225. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
227. 1998-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 3124.
228. See id. at 3155-56.
229. Id. at 3156-57. This is the rule adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in DeShaney.
See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989).
230. Osman, 1998-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 3159-60. The Court found that the right had not
been violated because the petitioners failed to demonstrate that the police knew or should
have known of the threat the killer posed to the family. Id. at 3162.
231. See id. at 3159-60.
232. 2002-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 151.
233. See id. at 163.
234. See id at 166.
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reasonably expected of them to avoid a real and immediate risk to life" of
the "public at large," where they know or should know of the threat.235
The ECtHR is not alone in construing the right to life as including a duty
to protect the public from the threat posed by non-State actors. While
Article 6 of the ICCPR appears on its face to protect only against
government interference with the right to life,236 scholars evaluating the
treaty's negotiating history argue the drafters intended to include a duty to
protect against violations committed by non-State actors.237 The HRC has
accepted this duty in its evaluation of State practice under the treaty, as it
refers to State efforts to protect against the threats posed by non-State
actors. 238 The HRC has also recognized a similar duty to protect against
torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment committed "by people
acting . .. outside their official capacity or in a private capacity." 239
Given that the law is still developing in this area, human rights bodies
have yet to define precisely which operational acts the public may
reasonably expect the State to undertake to protect public rights. In neither
Osman nor Mastromatteo was the Court called upon to determine which
operational actions were required because in neither did the Court find that
the State knew or should have known of the risk in question. In three cases
where the Court did find that the State did not take adequate operational
measures to protect life, the burden of reasonable action for the State was
heightened by its relationship with the killers.240  Thus, what is
"reasonable" in terms of operational measures where the States have no
special relationship with the offenders remains undefined.
Nevertheless, it is fair to assume that expulsion would be a reasonable
operational measure with respect to dangerous aliens, at least in the
ordinary course of events. Expulsion is the traditional tool used by States to
mitigate threats posed by aliens. And its importance is heightened where
there is an absence of alternative tools to protect the public, which as
explained in the previous part often occurs in terrorism cases. 241 But
235. Id. at 167 (citing Osman, 1998-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 3159-60). The Court held that
Italy did not violate the ECHR because petitioner failed to demonstrate that Italy's prisoner
release scheme systematically failed to protect the public right to life, nor that it knew or
should have known of the threat posed by these prisoners prior to release. See id. at 166-67.
236. ICCPR, supra note 83, art. 6 ("Every human being has the inherent right to life.
This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.").
237. See MARC J. BOSSUYT, GUIDE TO THE "TRAVEAUX PRtPARATOIRES" OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL & POLITICAL RIGHTS 120 (1987) (explaining that the
majority of delegates spoke in favor of the right to life including a duty to protect against
violations by non-State actors); NOWAK, supra note 99, at 123 n. 12 (asserting that the right
protects against violations committed by non-State actors).
238. See NICOLA JAGERS, CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS: IN SEARCH OF
ACCOUNTABILITY 53 (2002) (citing to Human Rights Committee materials).
239. General Comment No. 20, supra note 82, para. 2.
240. See Edwards v. United Kingdom, 2002-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 137 (holding U.K. failed to
take adequate measures to protect the life of a prisoner within its custody from threat posed
by another prisoner); MOWBRAY, supra note 219, at 17-19 (describing two cases in which
Turkey failed to take operational measures to protect life where the rights violator colluded
in some way with the State).
241. See supra Part II.B.
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human rights bodies have recognized that the duty to protect from private
actor harm is constrained by two considerations. First, any operational
burden is limited by resources, as any burden must not be
"disproportionate" to the risk.242 Second and more important here, the
operational burden is limited by conflicting rights. 243 Thus, the rights of
the alien are a relevant limitation on any "duty to expel."
This analysis recasts the issue facing States in transfer determinations
involving dangerous aliens as a competition between conflicting State
duties. The State's duty to protect its public from threats to life, torture, and
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment conflicts with the duty to protect
the alien from substantial risk of death, torture, or cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment after transfer. This clash of duties is also a clash of
rights between the right of the public to be protected from known threats to
their life and the right of the alien to be protected from the risk of post-
transfer mistreatment by another State.
Recasting non-refoulement in this manner is rhetorically important.
Human rights bodies, advocates, and scholars have been sanguine about the
risk dangerous aliens may pose to society in significant part because they
have failed to identify the human rights costs that result. Recognizing the
security consequences of non-refoulement as a competition between human
rights, as opposed to a policy problem for States, will encourage human
rights actors to wrestle with the difficult problems created when dangerous
aliens cannot be expelled. From the perspective of States, frustration with
the current rule stems from its failure to acknowledge the importance of the
State's duty to protect the public. 244 By recognizing this duty as a human
rights imperative, human rights law better embodies the rights trade-off
actually confronted by States.
Beyond rhetoric, recognizing competing human rights in transfer
determinations identifies an important shortcoming in existing law: the
failure to afford any weight to the rights of the public in the non-
refoulement test. Put another way, human rights law has categorically
preferred the rights of the alien to the rights of the public without any
explanation. To the extent thought has been given to this issue, it is the
power of the torture norm that is invoked. The next section will discuss
why such an explanation is unavailing.
B. Is Torture Different?
The limited justification given for categorically preferring the rights of
aliens begins and ends with the jus cogens torture norm. The ECtHR in
Saadi explains that if the right not to be tortured or subjected to cruel and
inhuman degrading treatment is absolute, and non-refoulement is a duty
242. Osman v. United Kingdom, 1998-VIlI Eur. Ct. H.R. 3124, 3159-60.
243. Id.
244. See supra notes 154-60 and accompanying text.
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emanating from that right, then this duty must also be absolute. 245 But the
Court's simple analysis elides over an important reality: not all duties
emanating from these norms are absolute under existing law.
The three relevant State duties at issue here are the duty to avoid
committing torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment; the duty to
protect from such acts committed by other States; and the duty to protect
from such acts committed by non-State actors. Human rights law currently
treats the first two of these duties as absolute, while accepting the third is
subject to limitation. As discussed above, human rights law does not
impose an absolute duty on States to protect against torture or cruel,inhuman, or degrading treatment committed by non-State actors within the
State's territory, requiring only that they take "reasonable" measures in that
situation. 246 Thus, the question here is whether the law has properly
grouped the duty not to commit torture and non-refoulement together as
absolute duties, or whether non-refoulement is more akin to the duty to
protect from similar mistreatment committed by private parties, where the
law recognizes limitations on the duty.
The different pedigree of the duty to avoid torture and cruel, inhuman,
and degrading treatment compared to non-refoulement draws into question
the current legal scheme. The duty to avoid committing torture or cruel,inhuman, or degrading treatment is jus cogens, meaning there is near
universal acceptance within the international community that it is not
subject to exception or limitation.247 While there is a vast literature on the
difficulty in developing criteria for jus cogens norms, a central feature of
such duties is a general recognition that the norm protects against conduct
"so morally deplorable as to be considered absolutely unacceptable by the
245. Saadi v. Italy, App. No. 37201/06, 49 Eur. H.R. Rep. 730, 761 (2008). Note thathuman rights bodies have not drawn a distinction between torture and cruel, inhuman, anddegrading treatment in their non-refoulement analysis, despite the disagreement of at least
some scholars that the latter norm constitutes jus cogens. See supra note 17. If the
prohibition on cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment were notjus cogens, then the ECtHR's
already weak argument against considering the conduct of the alien in granting non-
refoulement protection would be inapplicable to forms of mistreatment that do not rise to thelevel of torture.
246. See General Comment No. 31, supra note 83, T 8 (concluding that the ICCPR
requires States take "due diligence to prevent ... the harm caused by such acts by private
persons or entities"); Osman, 1998-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 3159-60 (explaining that ECHRlimits protection obligations to what is "reasonable" because of resource constraints and
conflicting rights); Veldsquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.(ser. C) No. 4, 174 (July 29, 1988) (interpreting the American Convention as requiringStates take "reasonable steps to prevent human rights violations"); see also John H. Knox,Horizontal Human Rights Law, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 23-24 (2008) (arguing thatinternational law acts purposefully in granting States discretion to determine what protective
actions are reasonably consistent with national laws and priorities).
247. Modem human rights scholars often label as custom norms that do not reflect
uniform or extensive state practice, but which are widely acclaimed as legally obligatory.
See John 0. McGinnis & llya Somin, Should International Law Be Part of Our Law?, 59STAN. L. REV. 1175, 1200-01 (2007) (describing move to describe norms as custom based on
opinio juris alone). Given the widespread prevalence of torture worldwide, this is one
example of that practice.
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international community as a whole." 248 To that end, it is striking that even
notorious torturers condemn the practice and deny engaging in the
misconduct. 249
The Bush Administration's comments on torture in the conflict with al
Qaida provide powerful evidence for this point. Even as the Administration
subjected detainees to waterboarding, long-recognized as an act of torture,
President Bush repeatedly denied that the United States tortured. 250 Memos
by the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel curiously refused to
characterize waterboarding as torture,251 despite taking the position that the
President had legal authority to torture in certain circumstances. 252 The
twisted and faulty logic used to define torture narrowly reflects the
sacrosanct nature of the duty to avoid committing acts of torture. A duty of
such a rich pedigree has a strong claim to subordinate all competing duties.
There is far less acceptance among States of the duty to protect against
torture committed by other States. This Article has already discussed
several instances where States have claimed the right to transfer individuals
to another State despite the risk they will be subjected to torture or cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment. 253 The United States denies that it has
any international legal obligation restricting transfer of detainees originating
outside the United States to other States, even where there is a substantial
risk of torture. 254 The Canadian Supreme Court has expressly recognized
that the Canadian Charter permits the State to repatriate an alien despite the
risk of post-transfer torture in exceptional circumstances. 255 The United
Kingdom led several European States in challenging the interpretation of
the EctHR that found an absolute non-refoulement duty within the
ECHR.256
The willingness of important States like the United States, Canada, and
the United Kingdom to challenge the legal basis for non-refoulement duties
is evidence that States see the duty to protect against torture committed by
248. ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, PEREMPTORY NoRMs IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 50
(2006).
249. See, e.g., U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/SYR/I (July 20, 2009) (noting condemnation by government of Syria of torture and
denial of using the practice).
250. See Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec'y, President's Statement on
the U.N. International Day in Support of Victims of Torture (June 26, 2004),
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/0
6 /2 0040 62 6-19.html
("America stands against and will not tolerate torture.").
251. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., to John Rizzo,
Acting Gen. Counsel of the CIA 16 (Aug. 1, 2002), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/zubaydah.pdf (arguing that waterboarding does not
constitute torture because the suffering induced is insufficiently prolonged).
252. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Alberto R.
Gonzales, Counsel to the President 46 (Aug. 1, 2002)
http://www.npr.org/documents/2005/nov/torture/torturebybee.pdf (concluding that the
President was not bound by congressional legislation banning the use of torture).
253. See supra notes 77-81, 156-60, 164-71 and accompanying text.
254. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 168-71 and accompanying text.
256. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
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other States as less important than the duty to avoid committing torture. In
this way non-refoulement is closer to the duty to protect against the same
misconduct committed by private persons, which is recognized as a limited
duty. And given the less impressive pedigree of this norm, it is certainly
more perilous to claim it trumps all conflicting obligations.
This descriptive difference in the way States value these duties is
normatively justified by the difference in culpability the law assigns to
intentional versus unintentional acts. An intentional act occurs when the
actor desires a wrongful consequence, or acts with substantial certainty of
that consequence. All other acts are unintentional, even when the actor
does not wish the harm in question, but acts despite great risk harm will
occur as a consequence of his action. Many bodies of law recognize greater
culpability for intentional acts compared to unintentional acts. Criminal
law generally draws a distinction between crimes committed purposely
(with a conscious desire to achieve the objective) or knowingly (with
practical certainty of the consequences of the act), and acts committed with
reckless disregard of wrongful consequences. 257 Similarly, in tort law,intentional torts result in a higher level of culpability than acts undertaken
with mere reckless intent.258
When a State commits an act of torture, or contracts with another State to
torture on its behalf, it acts intentionally and therefore with the highest level
of culpability. It therefore makes sense for the law to impose the most
onerous duties on a State to not engage in this conduct because it is the
most wrongful. By contrast, in both non-refoulement and protection from
private person torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, the State
does not intend the harm in question, and in fact may take active steps to
prevent the harm. This identical intent suggests that the duty on States
should be the same with respect to protection from any unintentional third
party serious mistreatment. 25 9  And because the culpability for
unintentional acts is less than for intentional acts, this duty should be less
onerous than the duty to avoid committing these acts.
Still there are some relevant differences between non-refoulement and
protection from private person harms. One important difference is control:
States have greater control over the actions of private persons within their
territory than over the actions of other States. Ironically, control may be a
good reason to conclude that States have a less onerous duty to prevent
257. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. 3 (Official Draft and Revised Comments
1985) (describing the reduced culpability for crimes which are committed recklessly, as
opposed to those committed purposely or knowingly). In some instances, such as treason,
criminal law requires a specific intent for liability, meaning that actual purpose is required
before criminal liability is incurred. Id. at cmt. 2.
258. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 cmt. f (1965) (distinguishing between
intentional acts and reckless acts).
259. States transferring an individual to another State despite the risk of post-transfer
mistreatment will be committing a reckless rather than knowing act because a State is
unlikely to have certainty about post-transfer treatment by another sovereign, except where
the State solicits such misconduct, as in rendition. See supra note 224 (distinguishing
rendition from most transfers where non-refoulement protection is incurred).
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mistreatment by other States than mistreatment by private persons within
their own State. Monica Hakimi posits that a State's duty to protect is
directly correlated to the degree of control it exercises over the rights
violator.260 Thus, she explains, protection duties are at their zenith with
agents or delegates of the State, over whom it exercises plenary control.
They are somewhat reduced with respect to territorial subjects over whom
the State has control, but whose rights restrict protection obligations. Such
duties are at their lowest point with respect to external actors, over whom
the State has the least control. 261 Application of this "control" test argues
that States should actually incur fewer protection duties with respect to non-
refoulement than with other third party actors. 262
Another difference may be the length of the chain of causation from State
action to harm. In the non-refoulement context the chain is short: one State
transfers to another State, which then inflicts the relevant harm. By
contrast, the State's role in failing to protect the public from a dangerous
alien may be more attenuated. But this does not always hold true. In the
Naseer case, for example, the chain appears equally short: State action,
whether it be Naseer's transfer to Pakistan or release into the United
Kingdom, leads to the feared harm, with just one proximate intervening
actor (either Pakistan or Naseer).
Moreover, there is good reason to believe chain of causation should not
be determinative of State legal obligations. Cass Sunstein and Adrian
Vermeule challenge the idea that the length of the causal chain in
government action, or whether the relevant State action is an action or
inaction, has any moral significance. 263 They explain that governments are
confronted with policy options, and are responsible for the consequences of
those options regardless of the length of the chain of causation. 264 Consider
the facts of the Naseer case. 265 There HMG had the choice to either release
Naseer within the United Kingdom or transfer him to Pakistan. To the
extent HMG is culpable for subsequent rights violations, it is based on the
260. See Hakimi, supra note 222, at 355-56 (arguing that State relationship with the
abuser, rather than with the victim, is the touchstone for the scope of protection duties).
261. See id at 357-67.
262. Professor Hakimi suggests in passing that the "sui generis" duties imposed by non-
refoulement are due to a unique relationship with the victim, perhaps created by the custodial
relationship. See id at 366 & n.158 (arguing that the relationship with victim may explain
sui generis scope of non-refoulement duty). But absolute non-refoulement protection is not
tethered to all custodial situations. Consider the situation where Mexico is holding a
Pakistani national suspected of involvement in a drug gang, whom it wishes to release from
prison. Under current law, if the alien provides evidence that he is at substantial risk of
torture by Pakistan after repatriation, Mexico has an absolute obligation to protect him from
that mistreatment. If, by contrast, the alien has the same evidence that he will be tortured by
a Mexican drug gang after release within Mexico, Mexico's obligation is limited to taking
reasonable steps to prevent that mistreatment. The duties are different despite the custodial
relationship being the same.
263. See Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required?
Acts, Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 703, 721 (2005) (dismissing
significance of omission/commission distinction with respect to government action).
264. See id. at 720-24.
265. See supra notes 1-16 and accompanying text.
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consequences of its policy decision. Why those consequences should be
evaluated differently based on the length of the chain of causation is
unclear.
Instead, this article posits there is no normative justification for imposing
upon States an absolute non-refoulement obligation. Non-refoulement has
a significantly less impressive pedigree than the duty to avoid committing
torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. And transfers to
mistreatment incur the reduced culpability associated with unintentional
acts. Without the high level of culpability created by intentional
wrongdoing, the argument to subordinate all conflicting duties is weakened.
Instead, non-refoulement is similar to protection from serious mistreatment
perpetrated by other third parties, where international law recognizes that
other considerations, such as resources and conflicting rights and duties,
may limit the protection provided.
Existing law perhaps is explained by the greater salience of one set of
rights at issue in transfer determinations. In the Naseer case, his right not to
be mistreated by Pakistan was salient in a transfer determination because he
was the subject of the transfer inquiry. By contrast, the rights of the public
are more obscure: it is harder to identify whose rights are violated when
Naseer is released into the United Kingdom, especially where his exact
victims cannot be identified in advance. 266 Nevertheless, as has been
demonstrated, this conflict is real, suggesting non-refoulement, like other
duties to protect, should recognize limitations imposed by conflicting rights.
III. MEDIATING BETWEEN COMPETING RIGHTS: BALANCING
A. Features ofHuman Rights Law Balancing Tests
If there is no a priori reason to prioritize the rights of the alien, the
question becomes how human rights should accommodate the conflicting
rights at issue in non-refoulement. Human rights actors and scholars
regularly oppose any change to the absolute non-refoulement rule because
of concerns that accounting for the threat posed by the transferee will result
in comparing apples to oranges. 267
As a general matter, human rights law prescribes balancing to mediate
between competing rights claims. Provisions mandating balancing between
competing interests are expressly included in multilateral human rights
instruments, such as the ECHR,268 the ICCPR,269 and the International
266. See Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 263, at 741 (applying these heuristics to
explain the failure to support capital punishment if it results in reduced homicides).
267. See Saadi v. Italy, App. No. 37201/06, 49 Eur. H.R. Rep. 730, 761 (2008) ("The
concepts of 'risk' and 'dangerousness' in this context do not lend themselves to a balancing
test because they are notions that can only be assessed independently of each other.").
268. See, e.g., ECHR, supra note 7, art. 9 (balancing freedom of thought, conscience and
religion against the needs of a democratic society to protect "public safety," "public order,
health or morals," and "the rights and freedoms of others").
269. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 83, art. 18 (allowing State restriction of freedom of
thought, conscience and religion where prescribed by law and "necessary to protect public
safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others").
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Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 270 as well as
newer rights provisions in national constitutions, such as in South Africa 271
and India. 272 Even in the United States, where rights provisions do not
include any express balancing requirements, balancing tests have been
employed in Fourth Amendment 273 and Due Process analysis, 274 and
balancing considerations enter other parts of constitutional law. 275
These balancing tests regularly require comparison of unlike interests.
For example, in assessing whether a State law prohibiting Holocaust denial
violates the right to free speech, human rights law balances individual
freedom of expression with the State's need to protect its population from
harmful speech. Balancing is also needed to mediate between conflicting
individual rights. Should the State recognize a practicing Muslim woman's
religious right to wear the burqa or niqab, if doing so threatens the equally
protected right to be free of gender-based discrimination? Thus, contrary to
the assertions of supporters of the current non-refoulement rule, human
rights law is very familiar with using balancing tests to weigh seemingly
incommensurate interests.
An important feature of human rights balancing tests is that they provide
States a margin of appreciation to determine in the first instance how to
choose between conflicting rights. This margin recognizes that cultural
differences may play an appropriate role in balancing. But this discretion is
not unbridled. Instead, the human rights apparatus, meaning courts,
international bodies, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), monitor
State action and use the tools available to each respective actor to push
States where it believes the State has under-protected a relevant right.
The ECHR is instructive in this regard.276 Article 8 guarantees the right
to respect for one's private life. 277 But that article also allows States to
270. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 2(1), Dec.
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 ("Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take
steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially
economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all
appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.").
271. See S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 27 (requiring a State to take measures to provide health
care services, food, water and social security "within its available resources").
272. See INDIA CONST. art. 41 (limiting right to work, education and public assistance to
India's "economic capacity and development").
273. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490-91 (1976) (limiting application of the
Exclusionary Rule to Fourth Amendment violations where the costs of application were
disproportionate to the benefit).
274. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (holding that determining
what procedural due process requires in a particular situation involves balancing competing
considerations).
275. For example, the levels of scrutiny employed to determine whether government
legislation restricting fundamental rights meets constitutional muster has an implicit
proportionality component.
276. The Human Rights Committee has adopted a very similar approach to analyzing
whether State restrictions on rights, such as freedom of expression, were in fact
proportionate to the rights protected. See Rep. of Human Rights Comm., 60th sess., July 14-
Aug. 1, 1997, T 514, U.N. Doc. A/52/40; GAOR, 52nd Sess., Supp. No. 40 (Vol 1), Annex
VI (1997) (concluding that in the case of Faurisson v. France, France acted proportionately
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restrict privacy rights where prescribed by law and "necessary in a
democratic society" for one of a list of permissible reasons for restricting
rights.278 States are granted a margin of appreciation to decide whether a
particular restriction on privacy is necessary for society, provided that
restriction is prescribed by law and designed to advance a permissible
purpose under Article 8.279 For example, this margin has allowed Poland
and Ireland to maintain more restrictive abortion laws, while other parties
like the United Kingdom provide women much freer access to terminate
unwanted pregnancies. 280 Thus, States can strike the balance between the
rights and restrictions differently, and still act in accordance with the
ECHR.
Nevertheless, the margin of appreciation is not limitless. The ECtHR
will set aside restrictions where they are not proportionate to the aim
proffered. For example, in Lustig-Prean v. United Kingdom,281 the United
Kingdom defended its practice of excluding gays from the military under
ECHR Article 8 on grounds that the policy was necessary to ensure the
operational effectiveness of the armed forces, and therefore was in the
interests of national security, a permissible ground for infringing privacy
rights.282 While the Court recognized the United Kingdom's margin of
appreciation to determine which restrictions were necessary to maintain an
effective military, it emphasized the need for those restrictions must be
proportionate to the aim served. 283 The Court then evaluated for itself the
evidence regarding the impact on military effectiveness of allowing gays to
serve openly, concluding that these concerns were insufficient to support a
ban on gays in the military.284
National court balancing tests have proceeded in a similar manner. The
South African Constitution includes numerous economic and social rights
modeled on the ICESCR that include balancing components. For example,
section 27 guarantees everyone the right to health care services, but limits
the government's duty to "reasonable legislative and other measures, within
its available resources, to achieve the progressive realization of each of
in criminalizing Holocaust denial). While laws banning Holocaust denial have been deemed
consistent with the ICCPR, they are not mandated by the treaty, and fall within the margin of
appreciation afforded States.
277. See ECHR, supra note 7, art. 8(1).
278. See id art. 8(2) ("There shall be no interference by a public authority with the
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-
being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.").
279. See id.
280. See CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS, THE WORLD'S ABORTION LAWS 2 (2008),
http://reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/pub facabortionlaws2008.pdf.
281. App. Nos. 31417/96 & 32377/96, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 548 (1999).
282. See id. at 574-77.
283. Seeid. at 580-81.
284. See id. at 581-86. The ECtHR, like some national courts, is empowered to set aside
State action where it conflicts with the ECHR. Other parts of the human rights apparatus,
such as the HRC or NGOs, rely on moral persuasion to push States to alter decisions that
under-protect a relevant right.
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these rights." 285 The South African Constitutional Court has explained that
it will defer to "rational decisions taken in good faith by the political organs
and medical authorities" regarding what level of services may be provided
given available resources. 286 Thus, the Court upheld a policy providing
kidney dialysis only to patients who may be cured, and not to those in need
of repeat dialysis, as a rational allocation of resources within the
government's discretion. 287 But it rejected as outside permissible bounds a
government policy denying nevirapine to pregnant mothers to prevent
transmission to children of HIV to a child, concluding such a decision was
irrational given the benefits of the drug, and its availability at zero cost. 288
These examples indicate that adopting a balancing approach in the non-
refoulement context would be less difficult than suggested by human rights
critics. It would allow States discretion in the first instance to determine
how to trade off the duty to protect the public from dangerous aliens, with
the duty to protect the alien from post-transfer mistreatment. And these
decisions are subject to comment or even legal review by human rights
bodies, which then push States to make decisions that fall within bounds
they believe are acceptable.
Several benefits from adopting a balancing approach emerge. First, a
balancing approach allows the law to account for all relevant rights at issue
in transfer determinations. Absent a reason for categorically preferring a set
of rights, this approach best maximizes rights fulfillment. Here, it is
important to remember that security concerns are already affecting State
action. Competing rights claims do not disappear because human rights law
believes they should. States have continued to address security concerns
created by the current rule, just in a surreptitious manner. 289 Enshrining
within the law the very trade-off in which States engage encourages States
to make openly the rights trade-off they now make surreptitiously, creating
transparency within the strictures of the law.
Second, greater State transparency and a legal rule which reflects all
relevant interests improves the ability of human rights institutions to
monitor transfer decisions, to the benefit of human rights. Currently the
human rights apparatus makes recommendations consistent with existing
law that fails to engage with the rights competition actually facing States,
reducing the value of these recommendations. For example, Human Rights
Watch (HRW) has issued reports calling for the closure of the U.S.
detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, while at the same time calling for an
end to the use of diplomatic assurances. 290 When faced with the reality that
such a position would preclude repatriation of many prisoners, the group
suggested resettlement in the United States or Europe without assessment of
285. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 27.
286. Soobramoney v. Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) at 776
para. 29 (S. Afr.).
287. Id. at 774-78 paras. 24-36.
288. See Minister ofHealth v. Treatment Action Campaign (No. 2) 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC)
at 764-65 para. 135 (S. Afr.).
289. See supra Part IC.
290. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 137, at 2.
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the security risks in such a course of action. 291 If by contrast the law
recognized the obligation to protect the public as part of transfer
determinations, the human rights apparatus would be forced to address the
rights of the public in its recommendations. HRW's suggestions would
have been more meaningful to U.S. policymakers if they addressed the
human rights costs of releasing prisoners into the United States or Europe.
One consequence of a balancing approach may be an incentive for human
rights institutions to improve monitoring of diplomatic assurances. Human
rights bodies have felt comfortable in a purity of position against assurances
because of the comfort that the legal consequence of not accepting
assurances was withholding of expulsion. Under a balancing approach,
where transfer may occur even where there is risk of post-transfer
mistreatment, the benefits of an absolute position against assurances will be
greatly reduced, and the human rights apparatus instead will have a
powerful incentive to push both the sending and receiving State to follow
their assurances.
Third, a balancing approach to non-refoulement protection will remove a
powerful obstacle to State agreement to additional non-refoulement
obligations. As discussed earlier, once non-refoulement protection is
understood as a manifestation of the duty to protect, its expansion to other
forms of post-transfer misconduct is inevitable. Full effectuation of human
rights requires protection from rights violations committed by others,
including other States. Such thinking is already occurring, with new human
rights treaties including non-refoulement protection and human rights
bodies interpreting older treaties to include such duties. 292 But States like
Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, for whom existing
non-refoulement obligations have proven difficult to follow given security
considerations, are rejecting additional obligations of this sort because the
protection duty is viewed as too onerous. 293
A balancing approach provides an avenue to address these concerns. The
scale of prohibited post-transfer mistreatment ranges from the most intense
(extrajudicial killing, torture), to the somewhat less intense (cruel, inhuman,
or degrading treatment), to the still less intense (denial of fair trial, forced
conscription of children). Similarly, the risks an alien may pose to the State
where he is located varies from very significant (mass casualty terror
operation), to somewhat significant (kidnapping or hijacking) to still less
significant (financial and other material support to terrorist organizations).
291. See id. at 27-28 (arguing resettlement conundrum is "an uphill struggle no doubt,
but not an impossible one").
292. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
293. None of these States signed the Enforced Disappearances Convention. The United
States has been clear that concern about the non-refoulement provision is a major reason for
its failure to sign the treaty. See U.S. Statement Concerning Draft International Conventionfor the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE(2005), http://www.state.gov/s/1/2005/87209.htm ("We have clearly stated for the record our
continuing reservation to the absence of language in Article 16 explicitly conforming this
text to the principle of NON-REFOULEMENT articulated in the 1951 Refugee
Convention.").
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By moving to a balancing approach to non-refoulement, States could
modulate the protection provided based on consideration of both the kind of
post-transfer mistreatment and kind of risk to society anticipated. Thus,
while the risk an alien may commit financial crimes may not warrant
transfer to torture, it may permit transfers where voting rights may be
deprived. Such an approach would encourage States to accept new non-
refoulement duties, with reduced concerns regarding the security
consequences of such a move.
B. Concerns About Balancing: Bias and Uncertainty
Despite the status of balancing as the traditional method for mediating
between competing rights claims, and the benefits suggested in the previous
section, the problems of bias and uncertainty may cause critics to
nevertheless argue that balancing is unlikely to produce a rights-optimal
outcome in transfer decisions. States are notoriously biased against the
interests of aliens, especially those perceived as dangerous. 294 This bias is
enhanced by real political pressures States may face to favor the rights of its
public over those of aliens present within the society. 295 A legitimate fear
is that bias may lead to overvaluing the rights of the public and
undervaluing the rights of the transferee. This bias may be given easy
effect in non-refoulement because of the difficulty in assessing factors
relevant to a balancing determination. Under a balancing approach States
should consider factors such as: the risk the alien will be mistreated after
transfer; the intensity of mistreatment; the risk the alien poses to the State
where he is located; the nature of that risk; and the likelihood that risk will
be averted through refoulement or its alternatives. Given epistemic
uncertainty regarding these factors, there is an opening for bias to color
State assessment.
It is worth noting at the outset that bias and uncertainty concerns are not
unique to a balancing approach. Under the current rule there is epistemic
bias with respect to assessment of the risk of post-transfer mistreatment. 296
While States will possess human rights reporting regarding the general
conditions in a receiving State, often that reporting will reveal little about
whether a particular alien is in danger of mistreatment. Diplomatic
assurances are designed to reduce the risk of mistreatment, but evaluating
the sufficiency of assurances may be more art than science. Does a
294. See Christiane Wilke & Paula Willis, The Exploitation of Vulnerability: Dimensions
of Citizenship and Rightlessness in Canada's Security Certificate Legislation, 26 WINDSOR
Y.B. AcCESS JUST. 25, 37 (2008) (discussing phenomenon of "rightlessness" among non-
Canadian citizens present in Canada).
295. See supra note 181 (noting criticism of Suresh on grounds that it would open the
door to bias against aliens).
296. The risk of post-transfer mistreatment of the transferee includes two components:
the intensity of mistreatment anticipated and the likelihood of its occurrence. In general
terms, these two elements reflect the importance that human rights law places on the
deprivation in question, and the probability that deprivation will occur. See Aharon Barak,
Proportionality and Principled Balancing, 4 LAW & ETHics HUM. RTS. 1, 11 (2010)
(providing elements of balancing test).
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particular official have the credibility to make assurances? Is the
relationship between States of sufficient importance that following through
on bilateral promises is important? Uncertainty allows State bias to color
evaluation of the sufficiency of the threat of mistreatment and the
sufficiency of assurances.
A balancing model would create additional opportunities for bias to
infect evaluation of uncertain factors. Determining whether an alien poses a
risk to the State where he is located will often require assessment of
intelligence information. 297 Even the best intelligence information cannot
predict with certainty what an individual plans to do. The United States and
numerous European States have hyped arrests of terrorism suspects as
important captures, only to later discover the individual had minimal
connection to terrorist activity. 298 There is also uncertainty about the extent
to which the receiving State actually will take steps to mitigate the threat
posed after transfer. For example, the United States credited assurances
from Kuwait that two Guantanamo detainees would be monitored and
prevented from returning to terrorist activity after repatriation. The
detainees evaded Kuwaiti security after transfer, and ended up as suicide
bombers in Iraq.299
Thus, the risk of bias coloring assessments of factors relevant to
balancing is real. Given these concerns, a rule utilitarian may argue that the
law must as a prophylactic measure prioritize the rights of the alien. While
it may be that in individual situations the result is a sub-optimal
maximization of rights, such an outcome may be justified because of the
inability of the State to be trusted to make a rights maximizing
determination. 300
As has already been discussed, lax enforcement in international law
weakens this argument. If the law ignores State interests in protecting its
population as a prophylactic measure, States will then act outside the law to
protect their interests. Moreover, there are tools available to human rights
law to minimize the impact of anti-alien bias in transfer determinations, as
297. The risk averted through refoulement should consider at least three factors: the
intensity of the threat anticipated, its likelihood of occurrence, and the likelihood the threat
will be averted through transfer.
298. The case of the Liberty City Seven is instructive in this regard. Upon arrest of seven
suspects in Miami, the Bush Administration announced it had thwarted a plot to destroy the
Sears Tower. See Damien Cave & Carmen Gentile, Five Convicted in Plot to Blow Up Sears
Tower as Part ofIslamicJihad, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2009, at A19. But evidence at trial did
not match this grandiose pronouncement, resulting in two mistrials. See id Ultimately, ajury did convict many of the defendants of at least some counts. See id.
299. Alissa J. Rubin, Former Guantanamo Detainee Tied to Mosul Suicide Attack, N.Y.
TIMES, May 8, 2008, at A8.
300. See Mattias Kumm, Political Liberalism and the Structure of Rights: On the Place
and Limits of the Proportionality Requirement, in LAW, RIGHTS AND DISCOURSE: THE LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY OF ROBERT ALEXY 131, 151-52 (George Pavlakos ed., 2007) (explaining that
institutional biases may require designing rights in a manner that over and under enforce
rights).
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has been seen in Canada, the only State to date to have adopted a balancing
approach to non-refoulement decisions. 301
The non-refoulement balancing test itself may be modified to mitigate
bias concerns by placing a proverbial thumb on the scale in favor of the
rights of the alien. For example, a State's authority to transfer may be
limited to situations where the risk averted through refoulement "clearly
exceeds" or is of "significantly greater importance" than the risk of
mistreatment. 302  The Canadian Supreme Court in Suresh may have
intended exactly this result when it wrote that transfers to torture would be
permissible only in "exceptional" circumstances. 303 This approach has led
the Canadian courts to reject several attempts by the government to
repatriate aliens in spite of the risk of serious mistreatment or torture. 304
Placing a thumb on the scale in favor of the rights of aliens is a
compromise between the current rule and a pure proportionality test:
limited over-enforcement of the rights of the alien is permissible to address
the risk of bias, without completely crowding out consideration of the rights
of the public. The degree of over-enforcement could be increased or
decreased depending upon the level of concern about bias.
The more attention the balancing test pays to bias, however, the closer it
moves toward the current rule and the fewer the benefits of a balancing
approach. As under-enforcement of the obligation to protect the public
increases, States will have ever greater incentive to return to self-help
options to avoid the security consequences of the rule. This outcome is not
surprising; the tighter the law seeks to cabin State discretion, the greater the
incentive for States to resort to mechanisms outside the non-refoulement
rule to address the need to protect the public. Thus, altering the
proportionality rule alleviates bias concerns at the expense of the benefits of
balancing described earlier.
Human rights law may also mandate a more robust process attendant to
transfer determinations. As discussed in Part II, human rights law currently
requires only that the alien be allowed to submit the reasons against
expulsion to a competent authority that need not be a court; to appeal to a
higher authority that need not be a court; and to be represented during
expulsion proceedings, with all requirements subject to waiver in
compelling cases of national security. 305 Greater process associated with
expulsions could address the bias and uncertainty concerns in two ways.
First, greater process increases the chances that incorrect government
assessments of risk may be caught and remedied. Second, a neutral (or
more neutral) arbiter may be less likely to allow bias to color assessment of
301. See supra notes 164-75 and accompanying text.
302. See Kumm, supra note 300, at 151 (explaining proportionality inquiries can bear the
weight of institutional biases through altering the formulation of the test).
303. See Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3
para. 78 (Can.) (describing discretion to deport to face torture as "exceptional").
304. See supra notes 172-75 and accompanying text (describing post-Suresh
jurisprudence).
305. See supra notes 103, 105-09 and accompanying text.
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factors determining whether non-refoulement protection must be granted.
The extensive procedures provided aliens prior to expulsion in Canada
appear to have achieved these aims. The Canadian courts have regularly
rejected the factual predicates offered by the government to support
expulsion despite the risk of post-transfer mistreatment. 306 Even where the
courts have upheld the government's fact finding, they have refused to
allow transfer on the grounds that the case was not "exceptional." 307
Nevertheless, there are difficult questions that human rights law would
need to answer before prescribing additional process in expulsion hearings.
First, are courts well suited to address the factual predicates underlying the
balancing determination? Non-refoulement determinations often will
involve assessment of intelligence information and foreign government
communications. The United States has aggressively pursued the position
that only the Executive has the capacity to make these sorts of
determinations, and it is inappropriate for courts to interfere. 308  The
experience of other States, however, suggests this concern is overstated.
Judges in Canada and in Europe have reviewed intelligence information to
ascertain threat levels and risk of post-transfer mistreatment, including
review of assurances to determine whether those assurances are sufficient to
support transfer.309
Still, to be meaningful, court reviews would need to look behind the
intelligence information proffered by the government. U.S. and Canadian
courts have questioned procedures in which the court is asked to evaluate
claims based on intelligence reports without being able to assess the
reliability of the sources that are the basis of the reports. 310 States may be
unable or unwilling to subject intelligence sources to even ex parte, in
camera examination by the courts given the risk of compromising those
sources. They may be more willing to allow access to intelligence sources
in an administrative hearing within the Executive Branch. But questions
would exist as to whether an Executive Branch official would qualify as a
neutral decision maker, capable of setting aside bias. 311
306. See supra note 172.
307. In re Jaballah, [2006] F.C. 1230, paras. 81-82 (Can.).
308. See Declaration of Clint Williamson, U.S. Ambassador at Large for War Crimes
Issues, para. 10 (June 8, 2007), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/i 16359.pdf (arguing that sharing with the court materials used to make
assessments about risk of post-transfer mistreatment would compromise U.S. foreign
policy).
309. See DEEKS, supra note 192, at 18-19.
310. See Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 846-47 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that
government evidence could not be assessed without consideration of the reliability of the
sources that are the basis for that evidence); Mahjoub v. Canada, [2005] 3 F.C.R. 334, para.
54 (Can.) (refusing to accept the Immigration Ministry's finding that Mahjoub posed a threat
to Canada without evidence that the Minister had independently reviewed intelligence
information, including source material).
311. See Declaration of Stephen Abraham, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army Reserve,
Reply to Opposition to Petition for Rehearing, at app. i-v, Al Odah v. United States, 551
U.S. 1161 (2007) (mem.) (No. 06-1196) (describing bias in favor of decisions to detain in
U.S. military Combatant Status Review Tribunals), available at www.scotusblog.com/
archives/Al%200dah%20reply/o206-22-07.pdf.
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Second, should the transferee play a substantial role in the review
process? The Committee Against Torture has been critical of the United
States for not allowing alien terrorism suspects to play a greater role in the
determination of whether or not there is a substantial risk of mistreatment
after transfer. 312 It may be still more difficult to assess threat information
without giving an alien the opportunity to respond to that information. But
how robust should such procedures be? The closer the procedures required
in the expulsion process approximate criminal procedural rights, the less
useful expulsion will be as a tool to protect the public. Ex parte, in camera
hearings, or allowing cleared counsel for the alien to review classified
information, may be a useful middle ground approach to reduce uncertainty
and bias in transfer determinations, while preserving secrecy of classified
information.
Third, if courts are to be involved in reviewing the factual predicates for
balancing, should they be involved in reviewing the balancing
determination itself? Uncertainty regarding the factors the State needs to
consider in conducting the proportionality review strongly suggests the
need for external review procedures. But the actual balance (i.e., whether a
particular level of risk averted through refoulement justifies transfer at a
given level of risk of mistreatment) might be viewed as a discretionary
decision best left in the hands of the executive once the factual predicates
for balancing have been verified.
The experience of the Canadian courts after Suresh suggests that courts
may struggle in making what is essentially a policy determination about
how to weigh competing rights without guidance from the political
branches. In Jaballah the lower court held that an individual who had not
committed actual violence could not be deported to face mistreatment. 313
But the court created this standard itself, in the absence of guidance from
the elected branches, or the Canadian Supreme Court, on which exceptional
circumstances would justify such transfers. If courts are expected to review
balancing determinations, they will need better guidance from State
political branches and/or international human rights law on the bounds
within which discretion is cabined.
Ultimately, bias and uncertainty, while subject to mitigation, are a reality
in any system that grants a State discretion to use expulsion to protect its
public, including the balancing approach suggested here. Given that reality,
as well as the unwillingness of States to comply fully with a rule that does
not protect State security interests, managing bias and uncertainty may be
the best the law can do.
312. See U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Conclusions and Recommendations of the
Committee Against Torture, 1 20, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (July 25, 2006) (criticizing
lack of involvement of those rendered in determination of whether they were at a substantial
risk of being mistreated).
313. In re Jaballah, [2006] F.C. 1230, paras. 81-82 (Can.).
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CONCLUSION
Identifying the human rights competition at issue in non-refoulement is
important for at least three reasons. First, too much of the post 9/11
dialogue among human rights bodies, States, and scholars has lingered in
the void of security-rights debates. These debates are ultimately
unfulfilling because neither side has anything of value to offer the other.
Human rights actors dismiss State security concerns as an impediment to
the important task of protecting rights. States view human rights advocates
and bodies as naYve, unable to appreciate the imperative of protecting the
population. The developing concept of duty to protect recognizes that
protecting the public is not only an important security imperative for States,
but also a human rights obligation. This fact has yet to fully permeate the
thinking of human rights actors. Once it does so, these institutions may
alter their calculus on important security-rights debates, including the
debate over preventive detention. At minimum, it will allow human rights
bodies and groups to speak to States by addressing the actual rights
competition driving State action, thereby increasing the impact of
monitoring activities.
Second, the act of identifying the separate State duties necessary for
fulfillment of a human right can lead to better enforcement of that right.
One of the most important insights of Shue's duty typology is that it is
almost never preferable to have protection duties do all the work because
doing so almost certainly results in rights violations.314 But this is exactly
what is happening with the torture norm, as the onus for torture prevention
is placed on the sending State as opposed to the receiving State. It is telling
that the largest number of communications heard by the Committee Against
Torture are against Sweden, a State with no history of torture, alleging
violations of non-refoulement obligations. 315
While non-refoulement should play an important role in advancing the
prohibition on torture, it should not play the only role. Human rights bodies
and groups need to increase efforts to combat torture in States where the
practice actually occurs if the right to be free of torture is to be fully
effectuated. For example, human rights groups would be well served to
work on improving diplomatic assurances practice in order to place an
appropriate burden on the receiving State, which as the actual torturer bears
the greatest culpability for the wrongdoing.
Third, human rights law works best when the law recognizes State
interests and then seeks to cabin those interests within reasonable bounds.
Human rights law is filled with balancing tests precisely for this reason.
The concept of margin of appreciation allows States to decide how to trade
off rights in the first instance. Human rights bodies and groups play a
valuable role in pressuring States to keep their balance within reasonable
bounds. Applying this model to non-refoulement increases the likelihood
314. See SHUE, supra note 33, at 61 (explaining that complete reliance on either
avoidance or protection duties is unrealistic, and "almost certainly not desirable").
315. NOWAK, supra note 85, at 160-61.
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of State adherence to human rights, and improves the quality of monitoring
activities of human rights groups. But granting States greater legal
discretion on transfer decisions must come with realistic steps to correct for
the threat of bias against aliens. Human rights law can consider placing a
thumb on the scale in favor of the rights of aliens, as well as increasing the
procedural requirements associated with expulsion, while being mindful
that requiring too many procedures risks once again pushing States outside
the human rights framework to address security concerns.
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